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Purpose and O bjectives
Purpose
The purpose of th is  paper is to analyze the marketing strategies used by 
Japanese industries to penetrate the United States market. The discussion 





. Place o f d istribution
Throughout the course of th is  discussion, the fo llow ing strategic 
framework w il l  serve as a general guideline when examining each of the 
marketing elements:
. Market opportunity iden tifica tion  
. Market entry 
. Market expansion 
. Market share maintenance
O bjectives
The objective o f th is  paper is to provide insight into the fo llow ing areas.
. The role of the government in assisting Japanese industries fo r 
international competition.
. Japanese success in penetrating the U.S. market between the postwar 
period and the 1980s.
. Current Japanese competition in response to the appreciation of the 
yen in 1986.
. Marketing strategies that are like ly  to be adopted by Japanese 
competition in the future.
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Introduction
During the past 40 years, Japan has shown the world successful examples
of modern economic growth. From the rubble of defeat in 1945, Japan has 
b u ilt an economy that is an inspiration to the developing world and a 
formidable competitor fo r industrialized nations. Between 1948 and 
1973, Japan s gross national product (GNP) grew by a factor of about ten 
in real terms — a figure 2.5 times higher than the world average. ^
Between 1971 and 1980. while most countries staggered through 
turbulent periods of economic slowdown, Japan's GNP rose by more than 
200%, ranking first among the industria lized nations. By 1980, Japan 
ranked second as the most economically developed nation in GNP and fourth 
in per capita national income. Since the postwar rehabilitation period 
ended, Japan has successfully fought o ff inflation and kept unemployment 
low. Japans major industries, being noted fo r their efficiency, surpassed 
all other developed nations in terms of labor productivity a fte r 1975. (See 
Appendix A)
Among the most profound changes is the fact that Japan has 
emerged as one of the largest exporting nations in the world, in 1985, 
Japan s to ta l exports amounted to over $ 175.6 b illion , 37 2% of which was 
from her largest trading partner, the united states.^ (See Appendix B) 
Japanese industries have consistently repeated successes in penetrating 
and dominating many foreign markets, to the point of triggering a 
Widespread outcry among its competitors for home government protection 
of local industries.
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However, the meeting in September 1985 among the Group of Five 
countries — the United States, Japan, West Germany, Great B rita in, and 
France — to intervene in the foreign currency markets, marked the end of 
a long period of profitable growth fo r Japanese industries.
This report w ill  attempt to provide insight into the major driving 
forces behind the Japanese success, particu la rly  Japan's marketing 
strategies. For a specific treatment on the subject, only the strategies 
used to penetrate the U.S. market w il l  be discussed. An analysis of 
current and future marketing strategies w ill  also be presented.
Before embarking on a journey to examine Japanese marketing 
strategies, i t  is necessary to discuss the s ign ifican t h is torica l 
developments of marketing in Japan and how the Japanese prepared 
themselves for global competition.
H is to rica l S etting
The beginning of the Tokugawa era in the seventeenth century marked the 
b irth  of the Japanese marketing system. The nation was ruled by the 
Tokugawa dynasty of shoguns, who were the pinnacle of a class society 
organized by profession.^ In a descending order of social prestige were 
the samurai, peasants, and artisans, w ith  the lowest being merchants 
since they were considered to be socia lly unproductive.
Despite the ir low social status, these merchants enjoyed 
considerable freedom in evolving the ir own commercial system that 
gradually developed into a complex structure which included collusive 
actions of p rice -fix ing  and other res tric tive  monopolistic business
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practices to prevent competition."^ Two major developments In marketing 
emerged from th is  system: f irs t ,  a system dominated by numerous 
wholesalers occupying the pivotal position in the d is tribu tion  structure, 
and, secondly, the existence of highly complex, fragmented, and 
specialized m u lti- la ye r d is tribution  channels consisting of reta ilers. 
This form of d is tribu tion  is s t i l l  predominant in modern day Japan and has 
largely been critized by foreign competitors as being a trade barrier. 
During th is  period, the shogun government continued to maintain a s tr ic t  
policy of isolation from the rest of the world, w ith  the exception of trade 
w ith  China, the Korean peninsula, and Mongolia.^
Japan held on to the closed-door policy fo r over two centuries and 
th is  might have continued unchanged i f  i t  had not been fo r the arriva l of 
Commodore Perry on the coasts of Shimoda in 1853. Thereafter, massive 
changes took place. Large-scale industria lization began and accelerated 
a fte r the abolishment of status hierarchy and monopolistic practices. 
Progress in itia ted  the emergence of the Zaibatsu* or business group 
system and the development of trading companies, predecessors of today's 
Sogo Shosha, or general trading companies. Industrial sectors began to 
gain prominence over the commercial sector as a result of government 
policies leaning toward production orientation.
*  As Rodney C la rk  describes them : " Each Zaibatsu  has a t its  center a 
holding com pany, controlled by  the founder fa m ily . Th is  w o u ld  o w n  a large  
proportion  of each of the dozen o r so core companies, including the b an k , 
the trad in g  com pany, the tru s t com pany, and the in su ran ce  com pany. 
Each of the  core companies w o u ld  o w n  a fu r th e r  percentage of the e q u ity  of 
m a n y  of the others. . . . Each core com pany m igh t have  one o r tw o  
associates , a ffilia te s  o r subsid iaries, so th a t the w h o le  za ib atsu  appeared as 
a v a s t agglom eration of re la ted  companies extending over a range of 
in d u s tries ."  °
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When the Second World War broke out, industries became highly regulated 
and rationing and price controls were enforced. The labor force was 
mobilized fo r the war e ffo rt and small re ta ile rs and wholesalers were 
merged as a means of attaining greater efficiency and labor savings.
By the end of the war, almost every economic ac tiv ity  ceased to 
function. In the in itia l stages of the postwar period, the economy 
was in total chaos. Partly w ith  the assistance from the Occupation 
Forces, the government sought various policies toward economic recovery. 
Strong support and assistance in a variety of forms was given to a handful 
of industries deemed essential fo r economic recovery.^ Major assistance 
was prim arily given to large-scale manufacturing. Once the post-war 
rehabilitation period ended around 1955, rapid economic growth wrought 
profound changes in industrial Japan.
Wtiait  11 T qoK T o T aks Qn. Tfifi. iWfi.s.1»
A fte r the postwar rehabilitation period, the process of reshaping the 
country began w ith  industries entering the consumer sector. Intense 
competition fo r domestic market share led toward the demand fo r 
sophisticated marketing techniques borrowed from the West, Furthermore, 
in order fo r a resource-poor country to catch up w ith  the advanced 
Western nations in a short period of time, i t  was necessary to pursue an 
export-oriented industrial policy set fo rth  by the M inistry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). Policies were also geared 
toward overcoming four major handicaps in order to compete abroad.
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These handicaps arose from the fact that Japan was;
-  A country in economic disaster w ith  runaway in fla tion  and a 
devastated po litica l and social fabric
-  A country lacking the m ajor natural resources — coal, iron, 
and o il — which are necessary fo r running a modern economy.
-  A country whose businesspeople spoke only Japanese and had 
l i t t le  knowledge of Western markets, culture and history.
-  A country whose product label 'Made in Japan" by connotation 
meant cheap, low -qua lity goods.®
In response, central economic policies established by the Economic 
Planning Agency of the prime m in ister's o ffice  were geared toward 
long-range planning fo r economic growth and identifying those areas 
where government support and action could best advance those plans.^ 
Thus, one key factor in the Japanese arsenal was the strong govenment- 
industry relationship. Major support came in the form of industrial 
policies that allowed the Japanese firm s  to coordinate and implement 
sector plans, such as for technological upgrading, including combined 
research, mergers, or other concerted e ffo rts  aimed at rationalizing an 
industry and adjusting to  market changes.*® This was made possible by 
the zaibatsu system.
During the war, the zaibatsu of business groups had grown into vast 
industrial powers. They served war needs w ith  re la tive ly  high effic iency 
but the ir monopolistic market powers tended to destroy e ffective 
competition. Hence, as part of the postwar rehabilita tion program, the U.S. 
government ordered the dismantling of the entire zaibatsu. * * However,
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the powerful MITI, who strongly favored mergers and o ligopolistic 
structures, reorganized the outlawed zaibatsu into two legal groups: the 
Keiretsu or modern Zaibatsu, and the industria lly  linked groups known as 
Konzern. The Keiretsu consists of two m ajor groups: the direct 
descendants of the old Zaibatsu, including Mitsubishi, Mitsui and 
Sumitomo, and the second group consisting of bank-centered 
conglomerates, including Fuyo, Sanwa and Dai-ichi groups.  ̂^ This move 
enabled the Japanese government to concentrate technology and resources 
in order to a tta in  superior efficiency.
Another form of support was government funding of research and 
development (R&D). This form of aid gave the Japanese numerous 
advantages, especially at the in it ia l stages of industrial growth where the 
need fo r financial assistance was highly essential. Other types of support 
were in the form of tax incentives, preferential tax treatment for 
h igh-risk ventures, and infant industry protection.
In order to accelerate economic recovery, MITI and the Ministry of 
Finance implemented policies that concentrated available resources in the 
areas of fastest growth in demand and productivity. The M inistry of 
Finance was able to determine potential areas of growth in the economy 
through close ties  w ith  the financial community. The banks also assisted 
in the development of the selected key areas by offering low interest 
rates on loans and monitoring the industrial management of the firm s 
through the ownership of voting stocks.  ̂^ With the banks on the ir side, 
the firm s were also encouraged to assume a high debt-to-equity ra tio  
since there is no need to finance their growth out of retained earnings.
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Hence, Japanese companies obtained the ir capital from banks w ithout the 
need to worry about pro fits , but only the ir a b ility  to pay interest
The role of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), which 
functions as a national market intelligence center, was to provide market 
information to Japanese industries. "Its  main function is largely 
informational and includes such a c tiv itie s  as publishing periodicals and 
monographs on foreign trade, collecting international market intelligence, 
collecting and disseminating current worldwide market data, sponsoring 
market research, and organizing trade fa irs  and seminars" The breadth 
of Information gathered by JETRO ranges from general data and trends on 
individual countries to custom-tailored studies. JETRO also provides 
detailed market information on competitors' activ ities , po litica l and legal 
conditions of foreign countries, and offers suggestions on product strategy 
to Japanese businesses.
Furthermore, the role of the sogo shosha (trading companies) has 
been c r it ica l in assisting the Japanese firm s that were competing abroad. 
Among the various roles that the sogo shosha assumed were organizing 
jo in t investments and resource development ventures to provide a 
constant supply of raw m aterials to manufacturers. Other roles include 
establishing a stable alliance w ith  the financial and manufacturing 
sectors in Japan and abroad, and acting as commission merchants for 
manufactured products of all kinds, always in the vanguard of Japanese 
exports. Between 1960 -  1973, 49.9% of Japan's exports and imports were 
handled by the ten largest sogo shosha.^ ^  (See Appendix C fo r l is t  of top 
ten Sogo Shosha and the ir activities) With a ll the necessary preparation 
and support, Japan was ready to compete in the international markets.
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Japanese Marketing Strategies: Postw ar -  1960s
Probably the best way to view the Japanese success is from the marketing 
standpoint — the four P's of marketing: Product, Price, Promotion and 
Place of Distribution. Based on Japan’s past and present actions, a basic 
four-stage strategic pattern can be observed from each of these marketing 
elements:
1. Market opportunity Identification
2. Market entry
3. Market expansion
4  Market maintenance
Throughout the course of th is  discussion, these strategic factors w ill 
serve as a framework when analyzing the various marketing elements 
where applicable.
A F irs t Step Toward Compétition
As of 1950, Japanese automobile firm s produced a to ta l of only 1,600 
passenger cars compared to the 1900s when total output exceeded 11 
m illion  cars; over 6 million were exported throughout the world. 
However, Japan’s success was not easy.
In the early 1950s, Toyota, being the industry leader, was the f ir s t  
Japanese automobile company to export to U.S. Despite extensive support 
from the Japanese government and banks, Toyota’s corporate planning was 
inadequate to successfully enter the U.S. market. In itia l entry of the 
passenger cars named Toyopet was a major failure.
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Not only was the car badly named, the Toyopet was also badly 
designed. The block-shape vehicle had engines that . . roared like a 
truck, the in te rio r was rough and uncomfortable, and the lights were too 
dim to pass California standards."^^ Toyopet was also overpriced at 
$2,300, compared to its  competitor, the Volkswagen Beetle, which was 
priced at $ 1,600. As a result, Toyota only sold 288 cars.
Other s im ila r fa ilures were also experienced by the consumer 
electronics industry. From these lessons of in it ia l market fa ilure, Toyota 
and other companies adopted major efforts to strengten the ir market 
knowledge and product planning. Their f i r s t  task was to identify market 
opportunities in the U.S.
Product S trateg ies  
Market Opportunity Id e n tifica tio n
The first major step in marketing was to identify the market 
opportunities ignored or poorly served by U.S. firms. This included 
selecting a few target industries that the Japanese government identified 
as being worthy of commiting whatever financial resources and support 
were necessary in order to assist Japanese industries to compete in the 
targeted market.
In the automobile industry, Toyota discovered a waning of the 
traditional love a ffa ir  of American consumers toward automobiles as 
status or sex symbols.^® A ttitudes had become more practical and cars 
were becoming more as a means of transportation. Furthermore, 
Americans were seeking a small fu e l-e ffic ie n t car that would cost less to
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maintain. The small car segment was dominated by Volkswagen (VW), and 
Toyota's success depended on competing and displacing VW. Toyota was 
able to p ro file  a consistent demographic and psychographic target, and 
w ith  th is  in mind i t  set out to engineer the ideal product — the Toyota 
Corona. This proved to be a great success.
This same success can be seen in the motorcycle industry. When 
the Japanese entered the U.S. market in the late 1950s, they saw a large 
potential fo r small fu e l-e ffic ie n t and inexpensive motorcycles. The 
Japanese manufacturers also viewed motorcycles more as sports vehicles 
than fo r transportation purposes. Honda, Kawasaki, Suzuki, and Yamaha 
successfully marketed small fuel e ffic ie n t and less expensive models 
when none was available from the American and European manufacturers.
Changing trends in the American lifesty les, partly triggered by an 
increase in discretionary income, led to the need fo r entertainment and 
relaxation. This analysis of American consumer profiles enabled the 
Japanese to iden tify  a huge market potential fo r consumer electronics 
products. The success stories of the color television, h igh -fide lity  stereo 
equipment, calculators and, recently, video equipment, have demonstrated 
the a b ility  of the Japanese to iden tify  market opportunities in the U.S.
Other success stories regarding market opportunity identification  
can be seen in the other sectors o f the consumer electronics industry, such 
as the photographic equipment industry. Japanese manufacturers were 
able to identify  major opportunities in the professional photographers’ 
market by offering a wide array of compact, more sophisticated and less 
expensive single-lens re flex cameras, as compared to the Europeans who
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were only producing expensive and bulky cameras w ith  lim ited  features. 
Japanese companies also saw the growing potential of the amateur 
photographers' market that was poorly served by the ir European 
counterparts.
The growing kitchen appliance market also attracted the attention 
of the Japanese. As part of th e ir love fo r durable goods, the Japanese 
were able to seek market opportunities by introducing innovative and 
compact designs fo r kitchen appliances from the ir homeland to the U.S. 
market. There were also other factors that the Japanese had to take into 
consideration when analyzing market opportunities fo r selected products, 
such as determining the potential demand, the product's life  cycle stage, 
and so forth. In th is  section, we have seen the Japanese' ab ilitie s  at 
identifying market opportunities in the U.S. and understanding the needs of 
the d iffe rent consumer segments.
Market Entry
The Japanese started the ir export e ffo rts  w ith  a "Trade or Die" mentality, 
the ir main objective being to h it the market hard and grab a slice of the 
market share. However, they faced the fact that the reputation of being 
"Made in Japan" was synonymous w ith  cheap goods of dubious quality.^^ 
The only hope fo r competition was to  upgrade product quality, while at the 
same tim e maintaining a low price given the advantage of low labor costs.
As an underdog, the most like ly  strategy was to carve the vacant 
market niche that was either le f t unattended or badly served by American
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companies. While most American industries centered their production on 
sophisticated products w ith  high costs and high p ro fit margins, the 
Japanese aimed their entry w ith  lower cost products such as television, 
consumer electronics, and home appliances.
E fforts to enter the U.S. market began in the home market 
testing grounds. Products that were introduced to the home market were 
carefully selected and designed w ith  a view toward achieving rapid growth 
and large production volume early in the product cycle.^^ Building on 
volume and driving costs down early in the product life  cycle enabled the 
Japanese to achieve economies of scale. Furthermore, riding down the 
learning curve provided further allowances fo r price reduction. At a later 
stage, when the need for market expansion arose, the increased export 
needs further resulted in a reduction of production costs while enhancing 
productivity. Consequently, the Japanese companies were able to 
significantly reduce the ir product costs in export markets, triggering 
charges of "dumping" being directed at them. This move is evident in the 
automobile, home appliance industry, semiconductor, photocopy, and 
other consumer electronics goods market.
In addition, the Japanese ventured to develop innovative 
products. By offering an array of products w ith  innovative features, 
functions and styles, the Japanese were able to penetrate into existing 
markets dominated by American firms. By concentrating heavily on a 
continous o ffe r of innovative product features and styles, the Japanese 
were able to shorten the product life cycle. An example of th is can be 
found in the Light-Emitting Diodes (LED) calculator market dominated 
by Casio. It then extended the functions by offering sc ien tific
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-  13-
calculators capable of solving complex calculations. To shorten the life  
cycle of the LED calculators, CASIO introduced liquid display calculators. 
In order to prevent competitors from fo llow ing too closely, CASIO 
introduced solar-powered calculators and, eventually, credit-card size 
calculators. Clearly, th is kind of planned obsolescence was effective at 
staying ahead of U.S. competitors like Texas Instruments.
To improve the "Made in Japan" reputation, the Japanese sought 
to emphasize quality, re lia b ility  and service. The story of Japanese color 
television sets is by fa r the most clear demonstration of success in 
Japanese market entry. Since Japan was considerably behind in television 
technology through the 1940s and early 1950s, i t  set out to acquire 
technology from such companies as RCA, EMI and Philips.^^ Instead of 
investing in R&D, the Japanese pursued a strategy of improving and 
building upon acquired technologies. This strategy has proven to be 
e ffective since the Japanese were able to adopt an emerging product 
technology and use i t  to compete within the U.S. market.
When color television was introduced in the 1960s, the 
Japanese did not hesitate to pour all their efforts into the development of 
th is  new technology. The high re lia b ility  of Japanese color television sets 
helped the ir products seize a 30%-plus share of the market before the 
wrath of the U.S. Congress came down upon them through the imposition of 
restric tions in 1977 However, the Japanese got around th is problem 
simply by boosting production at their U.S. factories. It is interesting to 
note that General E lectric was the f i r s t  U.S. firm  to introduce portable 
color television but i t  did not take too long fo r the Japanese to penetrate 
the U.S. market w ith  low-cost and stylishly designed sets. Instead of
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facing the new competition from the imports, U.S. firm s such as General 
E lectric, RCA and Zenith began to emphasize the production of large, bulky, 
and expensive consoles at the upper end of the market where the p ro fit 
margins were substantially higher. Market share at the lower end was lost 
to foreign imports without much of a struggle. If U.S. firm s assumed that 
consumers would perceive the “Made in Japan" reputation to be synonymous 
w ith  cheap goods of dubious quality, they had defin ite ly underestimated 
the competition. Not only did the Japanese succeed in the low-end 
segment, they were able to build sales volume high enough to generate 
su ffic ien t profit to finance production of larger consoles. By improving on 
the efficiency of the ir plants and stepping up R&D, the Japanese prepared 
for their assault on the high-end segment w ith  low-cost and improved 
color television sets.
The Japanese challenge in the automobile industry also came as 
the result of a well planned entry strategy. A ll Japanese cars entering 
were "Americanized." The automobiles were designed with left-hand 
steering wheel, su ffic ien t room to accommodate the average size U.S. 
driver, and the better emission control systems that were required by the 
state of California.
The Japanese plan to compete in the computer Industry w ill 
fo llow  a strategy s im ila r to that used fo r the automobile and the consumer 
electronics industry. This U.S. market w ill  be the toughest market fo r the 
Japanese to penetrate, partly  because of the plethora of domestic 
competitors. In a manner similar to what they did w ith  automobiles, the 
Japanese w ill  like ly Americanize their hardware and software so as to 
be compatible w ith  the domestic systems. Most Japanese have already
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-  Î 5 -
hooked up w ith  U.S. partners (e.g., Fujitsu w ith  Amdahl Corp. and TRW 
Inc.)^^ Entry strategies have begun at the low end of the product 
spectrum, aimed at aggressively seeking market recognition and a 
reputation for excellence, and fin a lly  winning over the loyalty of the 
consumers. At any rate, the Japanese started their entry into the U S 
computer market by mainly manufacturing low-end products such as 
personal computers, disk drives, printers and pheripherals. Strategically, 
th is move may prove to be extremely effective because these products 
w ill eventually gain brand recognition afte r they have stayed long enough 
in the m arke t^^ Furthermore, by f i l l in g  the ir sales offices and R&D 
facilities w ith  Americans, the Japanese will be able to engineer both 
software and hardware to adapt to domestic needs.
The a b ility  of the Japanese to enter the U.S. market has been partly 
due to a strong determination to succeed. For instance, "the success of 
Japanese automobile companies rests on three important pillars: f irs t,  
the strong competitiveness, second, a high speed of technological 
innovations and rationalization, and third, close cooperation between 
subcontractors and the assembly p l a n t s . O t h e r  reasons behind the 
success of the Japanese products is the commitment to maintain high 
quality standards through a dedication to the zero-defect production 
philosophy. The widely acclaimed loyalty and high dedication of Japan's 
low-cost workforce in achieving maximum productivity have also been a 
part of the market entry package. Research by the Boston Consulting Group 
has shown that productivity in the Japanese automobile Industry is 2 1/2 
times greater than in the U.S. and is growing at a rate of 8%.^^ At the 
same time, U.S. autoworkers are getting about $8 an hour more than the
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Japanese worker. (See Appendix D fo r costs comparisons)
During the late 1950s, most American firm s did not forsee a threat 
to the ir market share. This myopic view that the Japanese could do no 
harm has proven to be a costly mistake Indeed.
Market Penetration and Market Share Expansion
It is a known fact that “although everyone agrees that when they decide to
move into a market, the Japanese tend to take i t  over The Japanese
have been extremely aggressive in expanding their market share in the U.S. 
once they gained a firm position in the market. The Japanese pursued 
three product strategies in penetrating and expanding on the ir market 
share:
-  Product line expansion
-  Product line proliferation
- Product line innovation and improvement
Product Line Expansion
When an industry has f ir s t  been entered, the Japanese w ill endeavor to 
expand on the market segment. The reason for expanding is mainly to seek 
a wider coverage of the market and to serve d ifferent consumer segments. 
For example, Honda expanded on its line of motorcycles, offering 
motorcycles ranging from 125 cc. to 1000 cc. machines. The introduction 
of the new chic design scooter was aimed at younger consumers. The 
lower cubic capacity motorcycles were aimed at the young beginner rider
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or those who demand a fu e l-e ffic ie n t transportation vehicle. Hence, 
d iffe rent categories of motorcycles were designed to atta in wide market 
coverage.
The product line was also stretched to include other market 
segments such as the sports categories. The heavy emphasis on off-road 
motorcycle production illus tra tes  the marketing success of the Japanese. 
In the history of off-road racing, practica lly every national and 
international race has been won w ith  the more powerful and e ffic ien t 
Japanese-manufactured machine. In track races, the Italian lio to  Guzzi, 
German BMW, and the B ritish  Norton are no longer the legend of racing 
machines The race fo r the checkered flag is now among the Japanese 
machines — Honda, Kawasaki, Suzuki and Yamaha. Furthermore, the 
Japanese expanded the ir product line fast enough to deter competition 
from the American manufacturer, Harley Davidson, which manufactures 
only higher performance street and touring motorcycles rather than 
competing fo r the lower end and the off-road segment.
Vast product line expansion is also evident in the automobile 
industry. When the Japanese companies realized that not everyone wanted 
a small car, Mazda stretched its  product line to range from the fuel 
e ffic ien t Mazda 323 to the sports model RX-7, having the only production 
performance car w ith  the legendary rotary engine, which was tru ly an 
engineering marvel. Such a move can be considered as a horizontal move 
in product line expansion. Honda, for instance, created the model CRX to 
reach the sports category. Other similar moves were also in itia ted 
by Toyota, who produced the SR~7 model to compete d irectly  w ith  the
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Pontiac F ie ro . Mitsubishi, w ith  its  S tarion  model, and Nissan, w ith  the 
280ZX, are direct competitors w ith  Chevolet’s Corvette.
The Japanese also expanded the ir product line vertica lly  by 
reaching the lower and upper ends of the market. In the watch industry, 
Seiko penetrated the lower end of the market w ith  lower-priced watches 
under the brand name Pulsar.^^ Seiko also competed in the higher end by 
acquiring Jean LaSalle, in order to enter the higher-priced watch market 
dominated by the Swiss. In the automobile industry, Honda, which 
recently introduced the series, is making an attempt to reach the 
high-end market by competing w ith  Mercedes-Benz and BMW.
Ĵ ]̂[j]̂jQy|îjtLfc$îldL*JE™C.il3Lil*JLijLfîLI[.ij3LjLJLi£ijE!li
While product line expansion varies w ith  the product line width, product 
pro liferation actually expands the types and models at each point of the 
product line. Product pro liferation has allowed the Japanese to appeal to 
consumers of d ifferent income levels, preferences and tastes. It also has 
allowed a larger volume output, hence the domination of d istribution 
channels. This in turn prevents U.S. manufacturers from having access to 
scant shelf and floor space.
Product proliferation is common, especally in the consumer 
electronics industry. Casio has produced a remarkable range of 
calculators w ith  a series of functions, each d iffering  in style and 
features. Another example is Sony who pioneered the portable stereo
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cassette player, popularly known as the Walkman. The Walkman model 
has expanded to models w ith  only FM/AM radio, cassette player, or a 
combination of both. From each of these three versions, there is an 
average of ten d iffe rent Walkman models.
Hence, the product pro liferation strategy has given the 
Japanese the advantage of keeping competitors at a very safe distance by 
flooding the market w ith  hundreds of d iffe rent models from a single 
product. Such examples can also be seen in the photography industry. 
Canon, fo r instance, introduced the f i r s t  programmed 35mm single-lens 
reflex camera known as the AE-1 Program. Later, Canon introduced the I  
series based on the technology acquired from the AE-I Program. This 
pro liferation strategy resulted in a wide range of T models such as the 
T-50, T-70, T-80 and T-90. Each model d iffe rs  s ligh tly  in features and 
price.
The h igh -fide lity  stereo market is an example of another 
Japanese success story. This market was so flooded w ith  Japanese stereo 
equipment and components that U.S. manufacturers were forced to stay on 
the extreme high-end of the market, by producing highly specialized audio 
equipment and components fo r a small segment of the audiophile market. 
Even there, U.S. manufacturers s t i l l  have had to contend w ith  a few 
Japanese manufacturers, namely Nakamichi and Onkyo
Product Innovation and Improvement
The videotape recorder industry Is a clear reflection of Japanese 
innovation sk ill. Currently, the Sony Corporation and the Matsushita
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Electric Industry have a v irtua l stranglehold on the U.S. and the European 
m a rk e ts .A ls o , the Japanese pioneered the so lid -state  technology in the 
television industry, while the ir U.S. counterparts, s t i l l  bound to tubes, 
overlooked the new technology.
The Japanese were also committed to product improvements. 
When Honda introduced the Honda Civic, the car's body was susceptible to 
corrosion. However, dramatic improvements were made in th is area as 
well as in fuel efficiency, and th is enabled Honda to surpass the dominant 
Volkswagen Rabbit. In the motorcycle industry, Honda and the rest of the 
Japanese competitors were extremely aggressive in innovating and 
improving machine performance. Examples are the development of 
aerodynamic designs, w ith  the use of spoilers to deflect the wind; higher 
performance engines w ith  V-shaped cylinders, turbochargers, and water- 
cooled engines; and comfort and s ta b ility  in riding w ith  the floating shock 
absorber system. A ll these improvements were highly innovative and 
effective yet consistently overlooked by other manufacturers, namely 
Harley Davidson, Norton, and BMW.
Other product Innovations and improvements were evident in 
the consumer electronics industry, which is really the driving force behind 
the semiconductor industry. Examples of such applications include; pocket 
color television, computerized watches capable of on-line communication 
w ith  personal computers, "sense-surround" video components, and so forth. 
Despite the fact that Japan is behind the U.S. in semiconductor 
competition, the Japanese have the advantage because of their aggressive 
use of semiconductors in the consumer electronics industry. On the other 
hand, most U.S. firms like General Electric concluded that there was no
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benefit in manufacturing consumer electronics products in the U.S. except 
fo r "a parochial sense of con tro l... "^0
The wide application of the semiconductor in consumer 
electronics has crowned the Japanese as the leader in the world market 
for a number of products, such as photographic equipment. Japan has been 
the largest manufacturer in the world for the past few decades and their 
position as the world leader is s t i l l  unchallenged. The Japanese produce 
the largest variety of cameras, lenses, electronic flash units and other 
photographic accessories. A recent breakthrough in photography was the 
development of the "auto-focus" lens by Minolta.
Although the Japanese have been branded as "copycats" who 
lack innovative sk ills , the strategy to acquire emerging technology has 
worked to the advantage of the Japanese fo r certain products such as 
semiconductors and computer components. "Japanese semiconductor 
makers don’t strike many dry holes," said Lionel Ohlmer, Undersecretary 
of Commerce for International Trade. "They w ait fo r U.S. companies to find 
the market." ^  ̂ However, the Japanese may be on the right track by not 
exposing the ir investments to certain high risk R&D ventures where the 
U.S. has the leading edge. Instead, the Japanese purchase technology, 
improve on i t  while selling to the home market, and push fo r the export 
markets w ith  low prices when domestic volume builds up. On the other 
hand, the Japanese could opt fo r investing in more e ffic ien t plant 
fa c ilit ie s  and automation so as to reduce product costs. As a consequence, 
Japanese firm s have been able to compete e ffective ly  w ith  low prices in 
the U.S. market.
Not all Japanese companies have succeeded by purchasing
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technoîogy. The development of tape recorders, magnetic tape, 
transistor radios and televisions, the Trin itron color television tube, and 
the Betamax videotape recorder a ll represent Sony's emphasis on 
devising new products from w ith in , with l i t t le  purchase of technology 
from outside sources, also connoting a high-risk pro file .^^
Market Share Maintenance
From 1970 to 1979, the major U.S. color television manufacturers 
witnessed a decline in market share from 72.8% to 55%. This decline can 
be attributed to an increase in Japanese imports at the expense of the 
market share of U.S. f i r m s . This loss may also be attributed to the 
acquisition of Quasar/Motorola by Matsushita and the switching of Sears 
and Montgomery Ward from U.S. private brands to Japanese brands.
When a significant market share is obtained, the Japanese 
s trive  to maintain the ir market share. However, the Japanese presence in 
the U.S. market was being threatened by U.S. manufacturers who were 
constantly pressuring Congress to impose protectionist measures. In 
response, a number of Japanese manufacturers have gradually shifted 
the ir production fa c ilit ie s  into the U.S., a safe way to maintain or increase 
sales w ithout raising import volumes. This can clearly be seen in the 
automobile and semiconductor industries.
In many cases, the Sogo Shosha have participated actively in 
direct investments abroad. Japanese foreign direct investments have 
picked up considerably within the last few years. "Between 1980 and 1983
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(the last year fo r which figures are available), Japanese investments In 
U.S. manufacturing fa c ilit ie s  rose by 63%." Overseas production has 
been evident, especially in the consumer electronics and automobile 
industry. It has been predicted that by 1988, Honda, Mazda, Nissan and 
Toyota w ill  be turning out nearly a million cars and trucks a year in 
American factories.
The move to set up production fa c ilit ie s  in the U.S. was also 
made possible by the fact that many states, in need of additional income, 
are wooing large Japanese manufacturers with state tax breaks and other 
incentives. Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, Michigan, Illinois, and Washington 
are a few of the growing number of states that have sent trade delegations 
to Japan to solicit business. Tennessee, ". . , with twenty-nine Japanese 
companies employing 6,700 state workers, has attracted 12 percent of all 
Japanese capital investments in America." As a righ t-to -w ork state, 
Tennessee is especially popular among the Japanese firm s that are out to 
dodge burdensome labor contracts and costs, and unions, where the U.S. is 
considerably higher than Japan in terms of days lost as a result of labor 
disputes. (See Appendix E) Even though wages paid by the Japanese are 
less than the ir American counterparts, they are s t i l l  able to manage a 
highly productive and loyal workforce. The Japanese are also able to 
maintain the low-cost factor by investing heavily in highly automated and 
e ffic ien t plants.
Japanese industries located in the U.S. also went as far as 
seeking a considerable level of vertical integration by securing the ir own 
parts suppliers. Many Japanese parts suppliers have erected production 
fa c ilit ie s  in the U.S. to continue supplying their Japanese clients. Honda
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automobiles produced In Ohio w ill  be obtaining their steering wheels 
manufactured by Nihon Plast Co. U.S., while Nissan w ill be getting its  
radiator g rille s  and dashboards from Kanto Seiki Co.^®
Another move by the Japanese to maintain market share is 
involvement in jo in t ventures. M itsubishi-Chrysler and Toyota-GM are an 
example of the many jo in t venture programs at work in the automobile 
industry. An increased interest in high-technology industries led Sankyo 
Co. Ltd. to seek a jo in t venture program in pharmaceutical products w ith
E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co.^^ Some Japanese firm s have also assisted 
some ailing high-technology firm s in the U.S. by financing R&D. K irin 
Brewery Co. Ltd., a giant Japanese beer manufacturer, led a jo in t venture 
w ith  Amgen, a California biotechnology firm , by funding the research and 
production of a hormone fo r treating anemia.^® Such moves are part of 
the Japanese program to acquire invaluable technological data where the 
U.S. has the lead. Some critics argue that joint ventures may also lessen 
the potential fo r competition, since U.S. firm s w il l  have less incentive to 
produce competitive products in addition to losing technology to the 
Japanese. But jo in t ventures have helped U.S. industries to compete more 
effective ly in domestic and international markets, for example, 
companies like Inland Steel and John Deere have gained production and 
technological knowledge from jo in t ventures w ith  Japanese industries like 
Nippon Steel Company and Yanmar, respectively.
The Japanese have also continually upgraded the ir products by 
closely monitoring changes in consumer tastes and styles, and producing 
products to meet these requirements by improving on performance, 
features, styles and quality Japanese success has also stemmed from the
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fact that they are so much proficient than Americans at collecting 
business intelligence, so much so that some U.S. executives are convinced 
there must be a CIA-type organization behind it all, probably the 
In reality, JETRO, a subsidiary of MITI, is the intelligence network that has 
researchers gathering and transmitting market data from eighty offices 
around the world, including nine in the U.S.
As the nation excelled in economic growth, labor costs in Japan 
began to rise. Toward the mid-1970s, the Japanese made a major shift of 
their production to other countries where labor costs were significantly 
lower. However, the development and production of advanced and complex 
components remained at home to avoid the transfer of technology that 
would benefit the other nation. Incidentally, this was a valuable lesson 
that the Japanese learned from the U.S.; the color television is a case in 
point. The conventional wisdom was that these technology exports were 
on balance beneficial to the U.S. economy and unavoidable in the sense 
that, unless the U.S. firms moved of sold their technology abroad, they 
would lose market share and suffer a net decline in earnings.^ As we 
know by now, moving and selling technology abroad will eventually create 
new competitors. In the meantime, production facilities in Japan were 
upgraded and automated with computers and robots.
All of these strategies have allowed the Japanese to expand and 
maintain their market share effectively. Another reason why Japanese 
product strategies have proved to be effective is their ability to spot 
niches in markets caused by consumer dissatisfaction and then working to 
satisfy them. Plainly stated in the basic definition of marketing, to 
provide and satisfy consumers with goods and services at a profit.
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PriciBfl Strotegiei
Broadly, pricing is one of the most c r it ica l marketing tools available to 
any company and, in many respects, pricing is more of an art than an exact 
science. In order to have a general idea of how the Japanese pricing 
strategies work, the fo llow ing discussion w ill  examine pricing strategies 
based on three stages of competition:
- market entry
-  market penetration and market share expansion
-  market share maintenance
Market Entry
At the initial entry stage, the Japanese pursue two basic pricing 
strategies, although many d ifferent forms of pricing strategies may stem 
from these two depending on product, lifecycle, nature of competition, and 
other external factors. The two strategies are:
- Skimming pricing
-  Penetration pricing
Skimming Pricing
Skimming pricing is a strategy of establishing a high in itia l price for a 
new product at the higher end of the demand curve.^^ Japanese companies 
sometimes enter the U.S. market by establishing a high price, and th is is 
clearly found in the videotape recorder and the recent laser disc market.
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When the Japanese have the leading edge in a particular 
technology, they w ill attempt to dominate as much of the market as 
possible in order to raise entry barriers fo r U.S. competitors, in the case 
of the videotape recorder and the laser disc market, the Japanese made 
sure that the product was launched on a very large scale involving wide 
market coverage so as to accelerate the growth of the product cycle. The 
laser disc players were also priced fo r the higher end. The introduction of 
the laser disc players was relatively successful since i t  represented a 
dramatic improvement in sound quality as compared to cassettes or 
records. When demand caught up, i t  accelerated the product cycle into 
the growth stage. By then, the Japanese had generated enough sales 
volume to achieve economies of scale, thereby reducing per-unit costs.
As soon as domestic competitors began entering the market, 
the price of the Japanese products gradually declined. In order to hold on 
to the existing market share, the Japanese deployed their market 
penetration strategies. Massive product improvement. Innovation and
pro liferation occurred so as to leave l i t t le  room fo r the U.S. 
manufacturers. This strategy can be very effective in forcing a 
competitor to make grave sacrifices in p ro fit margin in order to survive 
even before sales have barely gone up. At the other extreme, i t  may force 
the competitor to retreat from the m arket A skimming strategy also 
discourages competitors from trying to enter the market at all.
Price skimming is effective when the nature of the demand is 
uncertain, when high investments are made in R&D, when few competitors 
are anticipated, or when the product is so innovative that market m aturity 
is slow. For instance, in 1978 Canon introduced a very advanced single­
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lens reflex camera model: Canon A-1. A fte r five  years, the Canon A-1 
continued to be rated as one of the most advanced camera in the market by 
a number of leading photographic magazines in the U.S. The In itia l re ta il 
price fo r the A-1 (w ith  the standard 50mm f l .8  lens) was approximately 
$400. No other competitor was offering a s im ila r product, but by the early 
1980s, when Pentax and Minolta introduced s im ila r models, the price of 
the Canon A-1 gradually declined to approximately $290. The price 
skimming strategy will cease to function at the point where further price 
reduction is no longer feasible At th is stage, the Japanese w ill  likely 
resort to market maintenance strategies which were discussed in the 
previous section.
Pénétration Pricing
Probably the most popular type of pricing mechanism used by the Japanese 
when entering the U.S. market is penetration pricing, or the so-called 
market-share pricing strategy. This strategy involves entering the market 
w ith  a low in itia l price so that a greater share of the market can be 
captured.'^^ Once the market has been identified, the Japanese w ill pursue 
a strategy of penetration pricing, followed by marginal pricing as volume 
grows la ter on. The guiding principle is to move rapidly down the 
experience curve; real unit cost declines each time production experience 
doubles.
As mentioned earlier, the Japanese were very careful in 
selecting products that could achieve rapid growth in a short period of
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time. Doing so enabled the manufacturer to enjoy economies of scale 
thereby reducing per-unit cost of the product. For many products, such as 
automobiles and consumer electronics, the domestic market demand was 
su ffic ien tly  high fo r the manufacturer to generate the necessary p ro fit to 
finance the expansion of production fa c ilit ie s  to accommodate fo r exports.
When the Japanese enter the U.S. market, they price their 
products s ligh tly  lower than competitors’ so as to win over the consumers, 
in some cases, the low prices may mean actual losses, but the Japanese 
view th is short-run loss as part of the investment in a long-run market 
share. This strategy can readily be seen in the steel industry. When the 
Japanese entered the U.S. market, they competed in price and quality. They 
were able to win over a s ign ificant market share from the U.S. 
manufacturers, who decided to manufacture specialty steel instead of 
confronting the Japanese. This presented an opportunity fo r the Japanese 
to modernize their plants and to invest in e ffic ien t and specialized 
equipment. As a result, the Japanese were able to produce low-cost 
specialty steel that gave them the advantage when competing against U.S. 
firm s in that segment. The Japanese gradually lowered the price of steel 
to a point where a sign ificant market share was acquired. In retaliation, 
U.S. domestic steel producers began calling fo r protection from the U.S. 
government
By the mid-1970s, Japanese steel-production costs were the 
world's standard because Japan's steel industry was acknowledged as the 
world's most e ffic ien t. "Japan was producing steel of unexcelled quality, 
in the world ’s most modern plants, w ith  the greatest quantity in the free 
world."
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M arket Penetration
In the laser disc player market, the Japanese were able to consistently 
introduce new models with innovative features and designs. Most U.S. 
manufacturers find it extremely difficult to compete with the Japanese in 
the low-end market, simply because they cannot afford to profitably 
manufacture products at the low per-unit cost that the Japanese are able 
to do. Most matured Japanese industries have shifted the assembly of less 
complex component parts to countries with low labor costs, such as 
Taiwan and Korea, while retaining the production of higher-technology 
components at home facilities.
By pricing lower than their U.S. counterparts, the Japanese were 
able to win over major high-volume retailers, such as Sears, to their 
televisions. Another example of pricing strategies when attempting to 
take over the market can be seen in the automobile industry. Japanese 
automobile companies priced their products substantially lower than their 
competitors in order to attract a high number of buyers. For example, the 
price war in the compact car market was very intense and yet the 
Japanese were able to maintain a $100 to $400 price advantage against 
the Pinto and the Vega.^^ Even today, pricing advantages stemming from 
differences in labor costs are still very significant. For example, in 1985 
a $6,000 automobile would cost U.S. manufacturers approximately $1,500 
in hourly wages, as compared with only $450 for the Japanese.^^ ( See 
Appendix F)
Ever since the postwar period, Japanese firms have been 
paticularly successful in their use of pricing strategies, partly because
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of the weak yen -  dollar relationship, low labor costs, and tax breaks for 
exports.'^® With the exception of 1973 and 1978 and between 1980 and 
1985, the weak value of the yen in relation to the dollar, which made 
Japanese goods less expensive in U.S. markets, has been a major pricing 
advantage fo r Japanese Industries such as the automobile, semiconductor 
and consumer electronics industries.
While most strategies involve low prices, the Japanese have 
also penetrated certain markets w ith  extremely high prices. The strategy 
of high level pricing, also known as a high active strategy, is appropriate 
under conditions where product quality Is not as easily determined. A high 
price provides a means to establish an exclusive image for the brand 
where the size of the market Is usually small. Nikon is a case in point, 
where the high price-quality-brand image fo r its  more sophisticated 
cameras was targeted toward the professional photographers' market.
Once the Japanese have secured a comfortable portion in market share, 
they w ill  begin to stabilize prices. This move may be necessary to 
prevent the outbreak of a price war where the the U.S. may reta lia te  w ith  
lawsuits against "dumping," and new trade barriers. In maintaining their 
market share, the Japanese will hold prices constant while competing on 
other non-price factors such as product quality, features and service.
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Unless provoked, the Japanese w il l  maintain a price at a 
certain level long enough to harvest the necessary p ro fits  to compensate 
for in itia l losses. When a ll the costs are recovered and the p ro fits  made, 
the product w ill  then be replaced with a newer substitute. This w ill 
normally happen when the product has reached m aturity, slow growth as a 
result of heavy competition, or obsolescence. When the product is 
replaced w ith  a new, improved model, a whole new strategy w ill come 
into play.
More commonly, market share maintenance means more 
e ffective means of handling competition. In order to keep pricing 
competitive, the Japanese have to look to other means of keeping costs 
down. At certain times, Japanese companies have continually been tested 
for their ab ility  to maintain market share. On August 14, 1971, President 
Nixon placed a 10% tax on imported product. This measure, together w ith  
the réévaluation of the yen and la ter the Arab o il embargo in 1973, 
v irtu a lly  elim inated the Japanese price advantage. But Japanese 
manufacturers like Toyota had been able to regain the cost advantage by 
investing in more efficient production fa c ilit ie s  in order to reduce the 
product manufacturing costs. Today, the Japanese cost advantage has 
been achieved by more automation through the use of industrial robots and 
computers, sh ifting  production of low-tech components to cheap labor 
countries, and taking advantage of the learning curve and economies of 
scale by building on volume.
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Promotion Strategies
The U.S. has a strong consumer-oriented market where brand is as 
important as any other non-price element that sells the product. When 
Toyota f ir s t  entered the U.S. market, i t  enjoyed the luxury of dominating 
the media since no other foreign manufacturer advertised on television.^^ 
Its in itia l e ffo rts  centered on heavy advertising toward the targeted 
market. Such a move was necessary to promote the awareness of the 
product and its brand name, especially when it was foreign in nature. 
However, fo r Japanese firms which, from the beginning, wished to have 
the consumers identify  the product w ith  the corporate or brand name, such 
a move did not come easily w ithout Incurring heavy advertising costs. For 
many companies, the 50:50 advertising cost support, where the 
manufacturer and regional dealers each incur a 50% share of overall 
advertising costs, was of critical assistance to Japanese companies 
entering the U.S. market.
With the help of JETRO and its  market intelligence networks, 
Japanese companies were able to accurately determine different 
consumer tastes and preferences across the d iffe rent regions in the U.S. 
For the Japanese, a great understanding of the U.S. culture was necessary 
to gain insight into the intrinsic value of a product as i t  relates to the 
consumer. Recalling the discussion on market opportunity identification, 
Toyota discovered what the automobile is to the Great American Dream 
where there exists a traditional love affair of the American consumers 
w ith  automobiles as status or sex symbols.
A t the market entry and penetration stages, Japanese
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companies were very aggressive at promoting the ir brand names. Names 
like Nissan, Sanyo, Sony, Casio, Seiko and so forth  are gradually becoming 
household names. It is common to see some consumers getting confused 
w ith  Japanese brand names and unable to d iffe rentia te  the different 
advertisements, nor are they able to identify the advertisement w ith  the 
product. Therefore, i t  is common at the in it ia l market entry stage that the 
Japanese continously bombard the viewers w ith  advertisements in order to 
establish brand name recognition, while aggressive promotion at the 
market penetration is mainly targeted toward the product itse lf.
Besides promoting through the media, aggressive sponsorship 
of sporting events has also enabled Japanese companies to gain v is ib ility  
in brand name recognition, Seiko, fo r instance, was very successful at 
promoting itself as being the o ffic ia l timekeeper fo r the Olympics, while 
Canon cameras have long been recognized as the o ffic ia l camera fo r the 
Olympics, International Grand Prix racing, and other major sporting events. 
The Japanese motorcycle manufacturers have also been dominant in 
sponsoring major races which include their machines. Automobile 
companies like Nissan have promoted themselves as manufacturers of high 
performance Japanese automobiles by sponsoring major racing events 
around the U.S.
Japanese companies have also promoted themselves by 
sponsoring "traditional American sports" such as football, baseball and 
basketball. Charitable contributions to selected organizations such as the 
United Way and colleges on behalf of the "Most Valuable Player" of certain 
games, illus tra tes  the types of goodwill promotion in itia ted by Japanese 
companies.
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Advertising Strategies
Since advertising is a major tool in promotion, th is  section specifically 
examines some advertising strategies used by Japanese companies. 
Although the Japanese were very aggressive at promoting their brand 
names, the ir approach was also subtle many ways.
Advertising strategies were careful to avoid a direct 
confrontation w ith  U.S. competitors. In 1959, when Honda f irs t  
established its e lf in Los Angeles, the slogan "You meet nice people on a 
Honda" made Honda motorcycles popular.^ By not loudly announcing their 
presence, most Japanese companies were able to erode their competitors’ 
market share w ithout triggering a strong retaliation.
When the initial entry was successful, the strategy of product 
innovation and improvements required considerable changes. During the 
market penetration stage, the Japanese were very cautious, given the 
growing trade pressures between Japan and the U.S. The advertisements 
downplayed the Japanese origin of the cars. Nissan, fo r example, bu ilt a 
campaign around " the inported car w ith  the American sp irit," and played 
up the American transmissions produced by Borg-Warner Corporation in 
some of its  models.
In order to expand on market share, many Japanese companies 
have attempted to "buy" market share by spending heavily in advertising. 
During the market penetration stage, Japanese advertising expenditures 
consistently exceeded U.S. competitor levels and have been the leader 
compared to other imports. In 1971, Toyota accounted fo r 39% of the total 
spot television advertising for imported vehicles, followed by Nissan w ith  
19%.^^
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At the maintenance stage, the Japanese s t i l l  set aside huge 
advertising budgets to continually promote new products and new models. 
The basic purpose in advertising has also been augmented toward 
responding to the U.S. competition. Advertisements at the maintenance 
stage reinforce growing consumer consciousness, about the quality of 
Japanese cars, re lia b ility , fuel e ffic iency and performance. Toyota asked 
customers to "see how much car the ir money could buy," emphasizing by 
1982 an accumulated 25-year commitment to the North American market, 
while Honda pointed out in 1979 that the ir commitment to gas mileage 
was a "Civic" responsibility.^^
In many respects, Japanese advertisements are no d ifferent 
from those of its  U.S. competitors. Even w ith  their extensive market 
knowledge, the Japanese firms would rather leave most, i f  not a ll, of the 
advertising work in the U S to the domestic advertising agencies. This is 
because advertising concepts practiced in Japan and the U.S. are almost 
the opposite of one another. Japanese firm s operating in the U.S. have to 
learn that although "mood” commercials work extremely well for their 
products in Japan, they are meaningless to Americans.
On the other hand, although comparative advertising is not 
accepted nor permitted by law in Japan, i t  is an e ffective  advertising tool 
in the U.S. Even so, the Japanese firm that competes in the U.S. is rarely, 
i f  ever, seen downgrading another Japanese competitor's products through 
comparative advertising. This is probably due to the fact that to look 
down upon one's competitor is not an acceptable business behavior in 
Japan. By avoiding comparisons, the Japanese have been able to prevent
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consumers from d ifferentia ting  the weaknesses between brands while 
establishing the image that Japanese automobiles, fo r example, are 
equally superior. This is unlike U.S. automobile manufacturers for which 
comparative advertising has been a major competitive tool.
For many Japanese firm s, advertising at the market 
maintenance stage has also served to enhance the "Made in Japan" image. 
The emphasis on quality products and service has, in many cases, 
succeeded in erasing the former poor-quality and cheap-product image. 
Automobile advertisements have long emphasized durability, quality and 
service. In short, the Japanese have coordinated their promotion 
strategies well w ith  their e ffo rts  to dominate the U.S. market. The 
Japanese have proven to their U.S. competitors that the ir presence should 
neither be overlooked nor underestimated. As an example of its  challenge 
to the U.S., Toyota once made a stunning advertisement for its  pickup 
trucks w ith  the message; " From the nice people who brought you Pearl 
Harbor."
Japanese distrbution strategies represent a major part of the ir overall 
assault on the U.S. market. Most Japanese firm s effected market entry by 
focusing on specific market segments and entry points. By doing so. the 
Japanese were able to concentrate a ll the ir efforts on the targeted area 
rather than trying to penetrate the U.S. from many d ifferent points. The 
Japanese focused on a particular geographical market, on specific 
d istributors and dealers, and/or on individual customer types, and then 
"rolled out" market penetration from th is base.^^
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I t  is a fact that many Japanese firm s began the ir entry e ffo rts  
in California. Being a major market and the one closest to Japan, 
California was an extremely popular beachhead among new Japanese firm s 
in the late 1950s and early 60s. Honda, fo r example, established its  
American Honda Motors Co. in Los Angeles. Other companies which started 
out in California included Toyota, Sony, Hitachi and Mitsubishi. The main 
reason California was chosen by some consumer electronics companies 
like Sony and Hitachi was the anticipated need of a place in which to 
locate production facilities in the future. Southern California has an 
ample supply of labor and the close proximity of Mexico provides the 
ava ilab ility  of emigrant labor.^^ Furthermore, the location of California 
could minimize transportation costs for products coming from Japan.
The Japanese have learned from experience that managing their 
own sales offices overseas not only gave them more control over the 
management of the product and distribution channels, it also helped them 
to gain insight and first-hand experience in the U.S. market. Hence, the 
sales subsidiaries served as the center where strategies were carried out. 
From its  in it ia l entry point, the U.S.-based sales office then attempted to 
secure specific d is tribution  channels and dealers. The recruitment of 
dealers was done on a highly selective basis. Toyota, fo r example, targeted 
well-established and reputable dual-line import car dealers who were 
experienced w ith  foreign products and whose customers were partia l to 
imports. Japanese firms also sought out those outlets that gave them 
broad market coverage, especially w ith  large re ta il chains such as Sears 
to whom Toshiba in it ia lly  sold its  television sets.^'^ Regional d is tr i-
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butors and exclusive d istributors were also used depending on the 
products. Citizen, fo r example, concentrated its  entry and market 
expansion e ffo rts  exclusively on watch dealers and jew elry stores.
The a b ility  of the Japanese to secure established dealers had a 
cost of its  own. Top p rio rity  was given to d istributors and dealers before 
anything else. Due to the previously poor image of the ir products, the 
Japanese had to o ffe r higher commission and p ro fit margins to dealers and 
d istributors than the ir competitors in order to have access to established 
d istribution channels. The Japanese firmly believed in giving the ir 
d istributors and dealers as much incentive as possible to push their 
p r o d u c t s . T h i s  move, in e ffect, turned out to be a major competitive tool 
for the Japanese.
The Japanese also made sure that there were sufficient 
regional warehouses available to provide uninterrupted supplies to the 
dealers. This Is especially important when the companies are expanding 
or maintaining market share. At th is  stage, product and service should be 
readily available. Honda, for example, established training schools in 
regional areas to ensure an adequate supply of ce rtified  mechanics at the ir 
dealership outlets. The Japanese learned from Volkswagen's good example 
by concentrating on d istribution  systems that could lessen the constant 
American fear of purchasing an imported car that could not be serviced 
outside major urban areas. 56
Domestic production fa c ilit ie s  in the U.S. have proved 
advantageous to the Japanese in many respects. Not only were the 
products exempted from import taxes and other charges, transportation
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costs were s ign ifican tly  reduced. And, in order to be assured of the same 
high productivity and sk ill level at the production fa c ilitie s , companies 
like Honda sent its  American workers from the Marysville manufacturing 
plant to learn productivity techniques in Japan.
A ll in a ll, Japanese marketing strategies have proven to be 
extremely lethal to the ir U.S. competitors. W ithin the past fo rty  years, 
the Japanese have shown the world an economic m iracle and a success 
story as to how to become world-class marketers. Japanese success not 
only stemmed from the ir marketing strategies but also from a number of 
factors which we w il l  b rie fly  examine in the next section.
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Other Factors Considered
The discussion has to this point examined Japanese success in penetrating 
the U.S. market based on their major marketing strategies. However, the 
marketing strategies were, in some respects, the result of other efforts 
that are worth mentioning. Assistance given to the various industries by 
the Japanese government alone cannot account for the success of the 
Japanese. Most of the effort toward success was due to the efforts of 
those industries themselves. In this section, we w ill briefly examine a 
few important elements that were important to the Japanese success.
Product Adaptation: One major factor that is crucial to exporting and 
entering a foreign country is the ability to adapt the product to foreign 
market needs. The Japanese dislike U.S. requirements on imported 
products as much as the Americans dislike the Japanese government's 
requirements. But the Japanese have learned that the best way around 
these problems is to quietly adapt the product to the market needs, rather 
than simply complaining about unfair nontariff barriers. Japanese 
automobiles, for example, do not have safety-glass windows, but every car 
shipped to the U.S. must be fitted with them.^®
While it  is not uncommon to hear many U.S. firms complain about the 
Japanese safety and testing standards, often criticized as being nontariff 
obstacles, it may be interesting to note that the U.S. is one of the few 
countries in the world that refuses to classify goods according to the 
Consultative Committee on Customs Nomenclature (CCCN). By not 
adopting the CCCN standards, imported goods have to be designed and
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constructed to meet certain U.S. import standards that are unique from the 
rest of the world. Thus, if the U.S. can have its own special requirements 
for imported goods, there is absolutely no reason to criticize Japan's 
special requirements for imported goods as a nontariff barrier. In other 
words, it is equally as difficult for a Japanese firm to enter the U.S. and 
vice versa. As Hisashi Shinto, president of Nippon Telephone & Telegraph 
(NTT) once said,Tor 20 years I went to US to sell my company's products. 
We devoted our major effort to knowing your government regulations, our 
customers' practices, and requirements. . . Hence, for U.S. firms 
intending to penetrate the 'tough* Japanese market, the key to success 
ought to be adaptation.
In d u stria l Collaboration: Another reason for Japanese success has 
been the collaborative efforts among the different companies within an 
industry. A case in point is the success story of the Japanese computer 
industry. For many decades, IBM has been the leader in the computer 
industry. In the 1960s, IBM was about twelve to fifteen years ahead of 
Japan in terms of technological lead. Fearing foreign domination of 
foreign computer firms in Japan, the government sought collaborative 
actions among Japanese computer firms to devote R&D in order to protect 
the domestic market. The Japanese government also saw the growth 
potential of the computer industry and perceived that Japan's future 
economic position was at stake.
Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, NEC, Hitachi, 
Fujitsu, and Oki were sponsored by certain government groups to get 
involved in collaborative research work. These government groups
; ?
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consisted of MITI, the Japan Electronic Industry Development Association 
(JE I DA), the Electronics Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ), the 
Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations), and other organizations 
affiliated with the government. By centering the few hundred researchers 
from the different companies on a single project, the results were 
stupendous. Within the past two decades, Japan has completely evolved 
past the first, second, third and fourth generation computers. Although 
IBM has continued to remain as the largest and most successful computer 
company in the world, the Japanese computer industry which was almost 
destroyed by the IBM System 360, has reduced the technological gap to 
perhaps a matter of months, not years.®® As a result of collaborative 
efforts, today the Japanese have been able to establish themselves as 
major competitors for U.S. firms.
Long Range Planning The long range view of the Japanese regarding 
their presence in the U.S. and in global markets is also another factor 
worth mentioning. A willingness to accept short-term losses for 
long-range profits is a key to success for many industries. Strong 
commitment to long-range management and technological research has 
been among the main reasons why the Japanese have been successful in 
staying ahead of the competition. When the Japanese successfully gained 
a large U.S. market share in consumer electronics with low-cost 
components assembled or manufactured in cheap labor countries in Asia, 
U.S. competitors followed suit by doing the same.
By the time U.S. firms had decided on doing so, the Japanese had 
taken another step ahead by Investing heavily In expensive automated
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production equipment in Japan. This enabled the Japanese to manufacture 
complex components at low cost In Japan while maintaining employment 
for the workforce, since the shift of production abroad usually result in 
layoffs at the home factories. By the early 1980s, U.S. competitors began 
to realize that despite the use of cheap labor In foreign countries, they 
were still unable to compete with the Japanese in pricing. This was 
especially true for the semiconductor industry where Japanese 
competitiveness had led to charges of illegal price-fixing, "dumping" and 
predatory marketing practices.
Y en-D ollar Relationship: Another major factor that contributed to
Japanese success was the weak value of the yen in relation to the dollar. 
As part of the postwar recovery program, the value of the yen was fixed at 
¥360 to US$1. This fixed rate was established to control the runaway 
inflation and to rebuild Japans domestic industries. With an undervalued 
yen, Japan was able to maintain high-export growth since Japanese 
products were less expensive in the U.S. A low yen value, together with 
the low labor costs, provided major pricing advmtages for Japanese firms 
entering into the U.S. markets. The automobile and steel industries are 
examples of Japanese success at market entry, partly as a result of the 
low fixed yen value. With increased exports, Japanese industries were 
able grow fast enough and reached the levels of the advanced nations, in 
terms of production and technology.
The fixed rate persisted for many years until two major 
international events occurred in the early 1970s. The "Nixon Shock" in 
1971 took place when President Nixon announced a defense plan for the
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dollar while terminating the fixed yen rate.®* By 1973, Japan adopted a 
floating exchange rate. Also during this time, the first oil crisis took 
place. For the first time in many years, Japanese yen appreciated against 
the dollar -  from ¥360:115$ 1 to ¥200;US$1 in 1973. Consequently, 
Japanese firms were losing their cost competitiveness in the U.S. market 
as a result of a stronger yen. One solution for Japanese firms to regain 
their competitiveness was to invest directly in factories and companies In 
less-developed countries to exploit the local cheap labor and raw 
materials used in production.®^ Production facilities in Japan were 
modernized to maintain domestic employment and to achieve low 
manufacturing costs. With a strong yen, imported raw materials also 
became less expensive and certain businesses, such as the automobile and 
steel companies, were able to maintain profits lost through currency 
exchange.
The value of the yen appreciated significantly from ¥240 US$ 1 in 
1977 to ¥I80;US$I in 1978 when the second oil crisis occurred. The sudden 
increase adversely affected the automobile industry but Japanese firms 
took on this timely moment to aggressively msrket their fuel-efficient 
compact cars and to gain a further market share in the U.S. Between 1981 
and 1985, the dollar appreciated against the yen, thereby giving a major 
boost to the competitiveness of Japanese industries in the U.S.
All in all, what the Japanese have thus far shown their competitors 
are only the results of their efforts. The strong motivation of the Japanese 
toward competition goes beyond the marketing strategies we have 
discussed so far. Other factors such as cultural, social, and a unique 
government-industry-labor relationship should also be credited for Japan's 
success.
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JAPANESE MARKETING STRATEGIES: TODAY
Throughout the last forty years, the Japanese have enjoyed a windfall in 
international trade. However, the year 1986 marked a new era for the 
Japanese where massive structural changes occurred in the competitive 
arena. Signs of trouble were everywhere. The Yen soared from around 
¥250 to ¥ 155 to a dollar within a year. (See Appendix G).
Japan's domestic economy weakened with unemployment 
seasonally adjusted to 2.9% in August, matching the postwar 
unemployment rate in 1953.^ With staggering profits, the Japanese 
companies are singing the blues. However, these hard times may result In 
making the Japanese becoming even more competitive than ever. Before 
arriving at this inference, it may be necessary to examine a series of 
related events occurring during this time period. The objective of this 
segment of the discussion is to analyze how Japanese Industries have 
learned to cope with the currently adverse situation, which may prove to 
be an invaluable lesson for the U.S. industries.
Dollar Bashing: Reducing The Trade Deficit?
In September 1985, the Group of Five countries -  the United States, Japan, 
West Germany, France and Great Britain -  met at New York's Plaza Hotel to 
fu lfill a major objective — to intervene in the foreign currency markets 
and to drive the dollar down. The historic event was not only successful.
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jt marked a turning point in the direction of international trade. 
Apparently, it also made Treasury Secretary James Baker a happy man — 
he was applauded for finally doing something about the U.S. trade deficit.
Among the Group of Five, Japan was more involved than anyone 
else since it had more need to ease the protectionist pressures in the U.S. 
which were threatening Japanese Imports. The Bank of Japan intervened 
by selling over $3 billion in return for an equivalent amount of yen in the 
Tokyo and New York exchange m arkets.^ Consequently, the shortage of 
Yen drove up short-term interest rates which sustained a stronger yen. 
Instead of arriving at around ¥200 to a dollar, as anticipated by the 
government and the industries, the yen strengthened even further.
On the other hand, the decline of the dollar would provide 
breathing room for many beleaguered U.S. Industries and a boost to their 
competitiveness in terms of pricing. Theoretically, a lower dollar would 
make U.S. goods cheaper domestically and, more Importantly, abroad. That 
should stimulate overseas sales which should translate into increased 
exports and an upswing in domestic economic activity meaning more jobs. 
Consequently, the trade deficit should be reduced.
The truth is that trade imbalance registered an all-tim e record 
high of $230 billion in defic it In fact, the trade deficit with Japan alone 
grew to $4.52 billion in July 1986 from $3.69 billion a year earlier.®^ 
(See Appendix H) In the next section, we w ill examine the effects of the 
high yen and its implications on the trade deficit.
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WUh the new reality of endska (the high yen), many Japanese firms are 
beginning to see profits and sales declining to their lowest level for the 
first time in eleven yea's, when Japan plunged into a recession as a result 
of the oil shock between 1973-1974. ^  Among the hardest hit industries 
are the automobile, semiconductor, consumer electronics, ship-building 
and other heavy industries which are already facing serious threats from 
the fast-growing competition from countries like South Korea, Taiwan, 
and other emerging newly industrialized countries (NIC). Toyota, the 
largest automobile manufacturer in Japan, saw pre tax recurring profits 
plunge by 25% for the first time since 1982. For the semiconductor 
industry, the prolonged "industry recession" has made times even harder 
for some firms such as Hitachi which experienced a 40% decline in profits. 
Even the powerful sogo shosha are feeling the pinch of the high yen as a 
result of lower sales abroad, particularly in the U.S. Japans domestic 
GNP also dropped for the first time since 1975, unemployment reached an 
all-tim e high since the postwar period as a result of declining exports, 
domestic capital investments have been reduced, and after a long string of 
successes — Japanese competitiveness is threatened.
Although the strong yen seems to be stymieing Japan's growth, 
certain industries' performance may have in fact improved. In the 
automobile industry, for example, overall export sales surprisingly 
increased by 5% with a record output of 6.24 million cars in the first half 
of 1986.®^ For the semiconductor industry, the sales w ill be expected to 
surpass the previous year by 18.7 percent.^® Statistically speaking, Japan
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is performing fairly well. But all these .indicators are mostly window 
dressing caused by the short-term effects of the J-curve and low oil 
prices. The J-Curve effect occurs when exporters raise the 
dollar-denominated prices of their goods in order to cope with the yen 
appreciation, thus leading to a temporary Increase in the nominal value of 
exports. Leaving all this aside, we w ill now proceed to examine the 
steps that have been taken by the Japanese In order to maintain their 
competitiveness in the U.S.
A high yen is not all bad for the Japanese industries. The appreciation of 
the yen against the dollar in 1978 and the oil crisis 1979 taught Japanese 
industries many invaluable lessons. Despite the short period of hard 
times, Japanese industries have shown to be even more competitive than 
before. Among the lessons gained from these turbulent periods was the 
emphasis on being less reliant on exports. The high yen also has its 
advantages as we w ill see in the next discussion.
Mergers and Acquisitions : During the second oil crisis in 1978, the
Japanese saw a gain in purchasing power of the yen abroad. Throughout the 
1980s, Japanese firms were gradually seeking mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) abroad. The rate of M&A has since picked up considerably. In a 
recent survey by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, about 705? of Japanese M&A abroad 
in the past years were in the U.S.^^ Major acquisitions included
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the purchase of Dunlop Ltd. by Sumitomo Rubber Industries, and the 
takeover of Isotech, a robot-grade motor manufacturer, by Nippon Seiko 
K K (See Appendix I for list of recent M&A)
The move to merge or acquire U.S. firms is also the pursuit of a 
strategy of related or unrelated diversification. Being ahead in many 
areas of technology, U.S. firms are attractive investments for the 
Japanese. In an age of high technology competition, the Japanese are 
spreading their efforts in high-tech R&D into different fields in order to 
stay close in the race to reach the new frontiers. For the Japanese today, 
the buzzword is "Diversify or Die.”
Diversifying through M&A has come in the form of many 
different packages. The transfer of technology is the most important 
factor behind many M&A. Other reasons include the need to step up 
domestic production in the U.S. so as to reduce trade frictions or to gain 
entry into new markets, M&A usually involves financially-ailing high-tech 
U.S. firms that have growth potential in their R&D. U.S. Industries that are 
likely targets of M&A include steel, chemical, drug, electronics, 
biotechnology and the like, the exotic high-risk firms. Although M&A 
permit instant access of technology from the U.S. firms, not all 
investments made by the Japanese have been successful. Kawasaki Steel 
Corp.'s acquisition of NKB Corp., a Santa Barbara producer of silicon 
wafers, resulted in heavy losses caused by the prolonged semiconductor 
recession.
Joint Ventures : This option is growing in popularity among Japanese 
firms intending to acquire technology. Prominent joint ventures include 
Canon with Kodak, and Fujitsu with Amdahl. With a strong yen, many U S
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firms are seeing the benefits of joint ventures since they are able to 
gain access to huge financial assistmce from their Japanese partners to 
pursue R&D. Despite the risk of the transfer of technology to a foreign 
firm, many U.S. firms feel that it may be necessary In order to survive and 
compete against larger U.S. companies. Joint ventures also allow the 
Japanese to gain valuable experience in engineering, fabrication, and 
complex manufacturing. But, as a result, some U.S. firms are strongly 
opposed to such ventures.
Direct Investments and Offshore Production ; Within the last few 
years, Japan’s direct foreign investments have picked up considerably with 
the U.S. (See Appendix J) An increasing number of Japanese firms are 
stepping up investments in research facilities in the U.S., partly to counter 
growing moves in this country to clamp down on the outflow of technology. 
With the help of a strong yen, funding the construction of research 
facilities is made easier. Companies like Sumitomo Electric Industries 
Ltd. have set up fiber optics R&D facilities in North Carolina's Research 
Triangle Park, also known as the ’Silicon Valley of the East.’ ^̂
In addition, Japanese companies are pouring research funds into 
universities such as Stanford University, the University of North Carolina, 
MIT, Princeton and other schools involved in major high-tech research 
MIT, for example, has 49 Japanese companies involved in its industrial 
liaison program. For $30,000 a year, com piles like Canon, Mitsui, Hitachi 
and NEC can have first-hand access to MIT research projects.
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Direct investments are gaining momentum among Japanese 
electronics manufacturers. (See Appendix K) This is based on the strategy 
of absorbing large currency-exchange losses rather than raising prices. 
Since the yen is expected to remain strong for a few years, direct 
investments provide an excellent opportunity to establish manufacturing 
facilities in the U.S. Already some companies like NEC are ready for the 
domestic production of fiber optics and digital microwave equipment in 
Portland, Oregon, a move to offset the yen's strength.^ Direct 
investments in domestic facilities in the U.S. w ill also reduce the 
reliance of the Japanese on exports, a move necessary to reduce 
protectionist pressures. Canon, for instance, has launched a new strategy 
involving an international division of labor, scattering manufacturing 
activities worldwide that w ill make Canon a corporation with no national 
identity and free from trade friction.^^ ( See Appendix L)
Offshore production seems to be the answer for most large 
firms. Over 60% have already moved to the U.S., while the rest are 
scattered over Asia where the Japanese started their investments in the 
1970s. At this time, the Japanese are getting return on their investments 
based on a long-range strategy. Countries in this region include South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Nissan and Toyota, for 
example, have stepped up production activities for certain automobile 
parts in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, where labor costs remain among 
the lowest among the NICs. Parts w ill in turn be exported to Japan for 
further processing or final assembly. For some Japanese parts suppliers, 
domestic production in the U.S. may prove to be less expensive than in 
Japan. As a consequence, many parts suppliers have moved along with
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their Japanese clients who have already established production facilities 
in the U.S.
Automation : Aside from the emphasis on offshore production to reduce 
domestic capital spending at home, many companies are retrenching by 
reducing the workforce at home and replacing it with robots and other 
more automated production processes. By 1984, Japan was the world's 
largest user of industrial robots in the manufacturing process and the 
number of robots can be expected to increase significantly in the next few 
years (See Appendix M) For the first time, many companies are 
sacrificing the “sacred cow," the lifetime employment system. However, 
lifetime employment is already a thing of the past for some industries 
such as shipbuilding. On the brighter side, some companies are 
maintaining domestic employment by producing a wide variety of 
sophisticated and complex component parts that require high labor 
involvement in the design and production stage.
Japanese firms are also placing heavy emphasis on automation. 
The new value-added network (VAN) has dramatically gained wide 
popularity among many large manufacturers. The VAN electronically links 
manufacturers . suppliers and customers together to provide even more 
efficient delivery of goods at reduced costs than the former just-in-time  
system. With the current tough times, the VAN is likely to be a major 
competitive tool for the industries hard at streamlining production and 
reducing costs.
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other Competitive Responses : Many Japanese companies are also
beginning to trim themselves by a number of measures, including 
reducing unprofitable exports. Other moves include importing component 
parts from low-cost suppliers from the NICs (Newly Industrialized 
Countries) and China. For some of the companies, the endŝ a could not 
have occurred at a better time. With greater buying power, the Japanese 
are able to import raw materials just as prices have plunged for many 
dollar-priced commodities, especially oil.
Among all strategic responses mentioned above, the issue of 
pricing remains the current central point of attention among all Japanese 
firms competing in the U.S. Despite the high yen, many Japanese products 
in the U.S. are experiencing little  or no price increases at all. Considering 
the struggle of the Japanese to penetrate the U.S. market over a decade 
ago, many firms are not about to give up the hard-earned market share to 
U.S. competitors. Many are absorbing the currency swings in reduced 
profits or even losses from their sales in the U.S. rather than surrendering 
to U.S. competition.^® Many firms have absorbed currency exchange losses 
by reducing their profit margins, while other companies have been able to 
stabilize prices by raising profit margins early in 1986 so as to remain 
competitive despite further appreciation of the yen.
There are also other manufacturers who have introduced new 
products to disguise price increases. Manufacturers have removed certain 
product features to hold down the price, or have added a few extra 
features and charge a disproportionately higher price.^^ Even so, certain 
markets can allow manufacturers to disguise prices to a certain extent. 
This is especially true when a wide variety of similar products is
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available from the U.S. competitors. For the photographic equipment 
industry where the Japanese have been dominant, prices have increased for 
the higher end products to offset losses in the lower end spectrum since 
consumers are less likely to be price sensitive for the more sophisticated 
and exotic equipment. Furthermore, the lifecycle for certain cameras is 
relatively short and the constant introduction of newer models permits 
many manufacturers to make price adjustments.
On the other hand, manufacturers of certain products are able 
to maintain profitability even with a high yen. Lower costs as a result of 
economies of scale achieved in production are able to offset the rising 
value of the yen. This is especially true for products that are still in the 
growth stage, such as the video tape industry where the demand is on the 
rise even with slight price increases. Furthermore, with the absence of 
U.S. manufacturers in the video cassette recorder industry, the Japanese 
can afford the luxury of increasing prices.
The change in marketing strategies for the automobile firms Is 
to move to a higher market where price competition is less important. For 
example, Honda introduced the new $20,000 Acura that is targeted at 
buyers who are not price sensitive. For other firms, television 
commercials are no longer emphasizing the low price value but rather the 
quality and newly-improved features and performance, or the stylish 
designs. Toyota, for instance, has emphasized the performance of their 
cars as being “Number One."
Since the lower dollar is supposed to be a relief for U.S. firms, 
this represents a rare opportunity for many firms to regain their 
competitiveness and to recover past losses in market share. Before 
looking ahead to the future of Japanese marketing strategies, let us spend 
a few moments examining the U.S. response to the current situation.
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The U.S. Competition : Recalling the 1978 endaka, most U.S. firms were 
able to gain slight increases in exports but these firms could have gained 
even more if they had seized the opportunity to do so. Most U.S. managers, 
however, have a "quick return" mentality in which they feel too 
uncomfortable riding on low profit margins while watching the Japanese 
competition raise prices. As a result, many U.S. manufacturers have 
traded long-term market share gains for tempting short-term profits by 
also raising prices. As for the recent endaka, history is onCe again 
repeating itself.
For some U.S. firms that are in bad financial health, the high 
yen represents a rare opportunity to reclaim lost profits caused by the 
previously strong dollar With higher prices for certain Japanese goods, 
U.S. firms are beginning to realize the competitiveness of their products in 
the domestic market. Meanwhile, there are other firms that see that the 
opportunity to make a fast buck is too difficult to overlook. For some of 
these firms, short-term profits are necessary for survival rather than an 
Increased market share, while others see it as a “now-or-never" chance to 
harvest as much as they can.
A weak dollar also helps promote U.S. goods in foreign 
markets, thereby increasing exports while reducing the trade deficit. How 
far the trade deficit w ill be reduced is yet to be seen. So far, U.S. exports 
are barely up.^® Although a number of U.S. firms have not raised prices, 
the low prices for U.S. goods has yet to reach foreign consumers. Most 
foreign middlemen seized the opportunity to stretch their margins rather 
than following up on the price cuts made for the U.S. goods. The major 
problem is that the middlemen are sitting back waiting for someone else
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to make the first move to pass the savings to the consumers. This is 
especially true in Japan where everyone is trying hard to survive the 
recession. Although many U.S. firms view it as a deliberate attempt by the 
Japanese distribution channels to obstruct the sale of U.S. goods, it is still 
too early to determine if this is true.
Japanese Marketing Strategies -  The Future
The race to reach the new frontiers of high technology is on. With Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone strongly believing that scientific and economic 
progress holds the key to the future economic and social well-being of 
Japan, the Japanese challenge w ill be even more aggressive. Although the 
U.S. w ill continue to maintain its lead in many areas of advanced 
technology, Japan has been able to surpass the superiority of the U.S. in 
areas such as optoelectronics while ranking second in many other areas, 
including development of new materials, biotechnology and computers.^^ 
With the Japanese government heavily funding advanced technology R&D, 
the race to build the fifth  and sixth generation computer ranks among the 
top priorities on national goals.
In trade, the sogo shosha w ill likely lead the way to future 
ventures by assisting industries in penetrating other foreign markets. 
Diversification into related and unrelated areas w ill also be a major 
agenda among Japanese heavy industries. A number of firms have 
already started to seek joint ventires with governments of a few South 
American countries to acquire raw materials. For the automobile industry,
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the domestic production of automobiles in the U.S. w ill increase along 
with the continuing wave of direct investments. Investments in expensive 
and highly-automated production facilities in the U.S. and NICs w ill 
enhance the price competitiveness of Japanese products.
For the high-tech industries, technology transfer from the U.S. 
w ill be a major objective This w ill include supporting U.S. universities in 
advanced technology R&D, acquisitions, joint ventures and direct 
investments in research facilities. Japan’s competitiveness in advanced 
technology w ill also gain momentum with the increased output of 
engineers and research scientists from local universities. With Japan's 
rising capability in mathematics and science in elementary and high 
schools, there w ill be an adequate future reserve of skilled and productive 
work force. Domestic spending for R&D from both the government and 
private sectors w ill also increase to accelerate technology growth.
With wide applications of high-technology in consumer 
products, Japan w ill be able to fortify its dominant position in consumer 
electronics. The Japanese w ill continue to seek market niches where the 
U.S. currently has a stronghold. Such industries may include aviation,, 
communications, or banking and other financial services. With a continous 
inflow of direct investments, Japanese banks are likely to increase their 
presence in the U.S. to aid Japanese import and export needs.
In the future, the Japanese w ill also need to contend with 
emerging competitors such as South Korea, which has already penetrated 
the U.S. automobile market with a bargain car. Other NICs are also 
beginning to tap the U.S. market using strategic patterns similar to that of 
the Japanese. Low-cost production and low prices w ill be the NICs
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major advantage and Japanese industries may need to reexamine their 
objectives and strategies in order to protect their market share, in the 
U.S. and in other foreign nations. While the NICs are attempting to capture 
the low end market of many products, they are likely to move up the 
market spectrum to compete directly with the Japanese in the future. 
However, they w ill need to win over loyal consumers of Japanese goods 
that have been dominant in certain markets for a long time.
The most likely strategies that the Japanese w ill pursue 
include an emphasis on product quality, service and a wider distribution 
network for their products. U.S. consumers who have been accustomed to 
Japanese goods w ill likely take to future introduction of new Japanese 
products without much persuasion. Within the next decade, it is highly 
likely that the Japanese w ill be seeking more joint ventures, especially in 
the service industry. With the growing trade between the U.S. and the 
Pacific-basin region, some U.S. firms in need of diversification abroad may 
begin to find joint ventures with the Japanese to be an attractive option. 
Not only do the Japanese have access to foreign market information and 
experience, they are also financially strong. Joint ventures between the 
U.S. and Japan w ill likely include management services, insurance, 
financial services, and other services with strong potential growth in 
international markets, hence emergence of the "U.S.-Japan inc."
In the future. Japan w ill likely to be more competitive than 
ever. With the currently strong yen, a nationwide industry shakeout w ill 
improve the competitiveness of many firms. The firms that could survive 
the domestic recession and the strong yen w ill then be more prepared to
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compete effectively. The 1978 rise of the yen toughened the Japanese 
and. if  history is to repeat itself, the U.S. can certainly look forward to 
more competition from the Japanese.
aS^ ComDetitiQn: What Went Wrong?
Despite a considerable loss of market share to Japanese 
competition, the challenge is far from over. There comes a time when U.S. 
industries w ill respond to Japanese competition. Often, it takes a crisis. 
So far, the response of the U.S. to the Japanese challenge has received 
more criticism than praise.
Critics have long argued that the failure to maintain product 
quality, the short-term market payoff mentality, and the reluctance to 
invest in long-term R&D and technological innovations were the major 
errors made by many U.S. firms. Other mistakes were most likely the 
result of poor judgement on managements part. In many industries, 
market share was surrendered to the Japanese without putting up a 
struggle. The television industry is a case in point. Instead of competing 
with the Japanese in the low end segment, U.S. manufacturers shifted their 
production emphasis to the larger and more costly models.
The position of the U.S. was also weakened by a lack of product 
innovation and product line proliferation efforts. Although the U S has the 
technological lead in areas like the semiconductor, the lead has not been 
accompanied by wide application on consumer products, thereby losing 
their market share in consumer electronics to the Japanese.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-  6 1 “
The quick-retum mentality has hurt many industries, which 
were more concerned about financial ratios than accepting high risks by 
pursuing product Innovation and R&D, or seeking investments in more 
efficient and modem production facilities. There was also a general lack 
of awareness of the competition. When the Japanese first entered the U.S. 
market, some U.S. industries never foresaw the potential threat to their 
market share. Many took their dominant market position for granted and 
did not respond aggressively to the new competition.
In contrast, many industries blame their inability to compete 
on the government, labor unions, or foreign trade barriers. There may be 
some degree of truth to their charges; after all, a firm does not operate 
alone in the environment The economic policies of the U.S. government 
have been blamed for the deterioration of the U.S. lead in advanced 
technology. Other industries attribute their inability to compete as a 
result of high U.S. labor costs. Management has blamed labor unions for 
demanding excessive wages, resulting in higher manufacturing costs and 
higher-priced products. In return, labor unions blamed management for 
being more concerned about profits than in its workforce.
The problems U.S. industries are facing are far more complex. 
Other influencing factors include political, legal, ethical, social, and an 
endless list of other issues. A full discussion of these issues is, however, 
beyond the scope of our discussion. Although U.S. competition has suffered 
some heavy casualties during the past decade or so, it is never too late to 
make a comeback. (See Appendix N for a response model proposed by 
Kotler, Fahey and Jatusripitak.®®)
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Conclusion
Japan has shown the world an economic miracle. During the past 
three decades, Japanese companies have changed the dynamics of 
competition in the U.S. and international markets. They have also molded 
the world we live in by offering goods and services that would not have 
otherwise existed.
Japan’s success was not by chance, it was the result of a w ell- 
coordinated national program involving a unique government-industry 
relationship aimed toward a common goal — to be the best in global 
competition. In the course of reaching this goal, the Japanese have proven 
themselves as formidable competitors to their U.S. counterparts.
In response, U.S. industries have learned that the arena of 
competition is no longer limited by the boundaries of the domestic market 
but now includes many other markets abroad. In facing the Japanese 
challenge, many U.S. industries will need to take on a global market view, 
not only to remain competitive but also to survive.
By and large, the U.S. has been more competitive than before. With 
its long history of management excellence in terms of creativity and 
innovativeness, the U.S. can rest assured that the flow of talented and 
skilled human resources w ill continue to make its industries competitive. 
Despite the loss of some market share to the Japanese challenge, the U.S. 
should be proud that it was the one who taught the Japanese the basics of 
marketing. In turn, the Japanese wrote the success story on the making of 
world-class marketers.
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Source: Bank of Japan, C om parative International Statistics. 1986.
(Abstracted from japan 1986. Keizai Koho Center. p .7 I.)
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Japan*» Leading Hradlng Partn»r> (1993—1985)*>
Japan's Exports to- Japans Imports (mm—
(USS million except %> 1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985
U SA 42,829 59,937 65,278 29 1% 35 2% 37 2% 24.647 26 862 25,793 19,5% 19 7% 199%
EC 18,523 19.405 20,016 126 11 4 11 4 8,120 9,334 8,893 6 4 6 8 6 9
China 4.912 7.217 12,477 3 3 4 2 7 1 5,087 5,958 6,483 4 0 4 4 5 0
Saudi Arabia 6.687 5.634 3,890 4 6 3 3 2,2 15 530 14 734 10,245 123 108 7 9
Australia 4.280 5.184 5,379 2 9 3 0 3.1 6,642 7 296 7,452 53 5 3 58
Indonesia 3,552 3.073 2,172 24 1 8 12 10,432 11,175 10,119 83 8 2 78
Korea. Rep, of 6.004 7.227 7,097 4 1 4 2 4 0 3.365 4,213 4,092 2 7 3 1 32
United Arab Emirates 1 357 1,126 1,184 0 9 0 7 0 7 7.793 7.720 8,918 6 2 5 7 6 9
Germany, FR 5,877 6622 8,938 4 0 3 9 4 0 2 414 2,684 2,928 19 2 0 2 3
Canada 3,625 4 297 4,520 2 5 2 5 2 6 4,430 4 945 4,773 3 5 3 6 3 7
Taiwan 5086 5 986 5,025 3 5 3 5 2 9 2,622 3 204 3,3M 2 1 2.3 26
Hong Kong 5.289 6.559 8,509 3 6 3 9 3 7 570 842 767 0 5 0 6 06
UK 4 983 4.675 4,723 3 4 2 7 2 7 1 940 2,267 1,817 1 5 17 1.4
Malaysia 2 771 2,875 2,188 1 9 17 1 2 3,131 4,412 4,330 2 5 32 33
Singapore 4 448 4 610 3,880 3 0 2 7 2 2 1 468 1.775 1,594 1.2 1 3 1.2
Japan's Exports to— Japans imports from—
(USS million except %) 1983 1984 198S 1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985
USSR 2,821 2,518 2,751 19%  15%  16%  1,456 1,394 1,429 1.2% 10% 11%
Iran 2 820 1 692 1,348 1 9 10 0 8 4,231 2,869 2,508 33 2 1 1 9
Oman 468 508 554 0 3 0 3 0 3 2 012 2.420 3,068 16 1 a 2 4
Panama 2 169 3,444 3,328 1 5 20 19 68 168 81 0.1 0 1 0 1
France 2,010 1.935 2,083 1.4 11 1 2 1 302 1 236 1,324 10 09 10
'hail and 2 506 2,425 2,030 1 7 1 4 1 2 1.019 1 040 1,027 0.8 08 0 8
Switzerland 1,144 1 089 1,181 0 8 0 6 0 7 1,412 1.965 1,758 11 1.4 1 4
Mexico 579 888 994 0 4 0 5 0 6 1.889 2 260 1,870 15 1 7 1 4
South Africa 1 738 1840 i.cao 1 2 1.1 0,6 1,587 1,611 1.1 1 3 1 2 1 4
India 1,431 1,168 1,598 10 0 7 0 9 1.131 1.132 1,189 0 9 0 8 0 9
Kuwait 1.763 1 432 1,538 1 2 0 8 0 9 1 387 1,588 1,182 1 1 1 2 0 9




738 640 815 0 5 0 4 0 4 1 669 1 991 1,840 1 3 1 5
233 175 184 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 701 2,594 2,185 13 1 9
1 4
1 7
146 927 170,114 175,638 100 0 100 0 100 0 126.393 136,503 129,539 lOOO 100,0 100 0
a) In oraer of total value exports plus imports m 198S
Source; Japan Tantf Association. The Summary Report: Trade ot Japan.
(Abstracted from Japan 1986. Keizai Koho Center, p.40-41.)
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Sales o f Japan's Top Nine Sogo Shosha (F Y I9 6 5 )
(¥ billion)








Mitsubishi 16,332 6,413 2,579 4,697 2,625
Mitsui 16,020 6,063 2,738 3,869 3,350
C. Itoh 15,324 6,914 2,953 2,636 2,821
Sumitomo 14,226 6,637 3,030 2,983 1,576
Marubeni 13,916 4,695 3,523 2,841 2,857
Nissho Iwai 8,821 2,838 1,326 2,506 2,151
ToyoMenka 4,771 1,828 1,090 984 869
Nichimen 4,515 1,072 727 625 2.091
Kanematsu-Oosho 4,247 1,802 445 1,229 771
Total(A) 9 8 ,1 7 2 3 8 .2 8 0 1 8 ,411 2 2 ,3 7 0 19 ,111
Share(*) 100.00 39.0 18.7 22.8 19.5
Japan's Trade, total(B) - - 41,956 31,085 -
Sogo Shosha' 9 Share 
(A /B )
- — 4 3 .9 * 72 .0 * —
Source Abstracted from Kei2Bi Koho Center. Japan 1986. from Japan 
Foreign Trade Council, Inc.
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MANUFACTURING COSTS FOR A TYPICAL SUBCOMPACT CAR 
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Source: Fortune. June 2 5 . 1964. p.23.
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Days Lost in Labor Disputes (1975-1985)*^
( Î ,000 man-days)
US.A. Italy U.K. France Qermany
FR.
1975 31,237 27,189 6.012 3,869 7 .9 7 4 69
1976 37,859 25,378 3,284 5,011 3 ,2 2 4 534
1977 21,258 16,566 10,142 3,666 1 ,4 9 8 24
1978 23,774 10,177 9,405 2,200 1 .3 5 3 4,281
1979 20,409 27,530 29,474 3,172 9 1 9 483
1980 20,844 16,457 11,964 1,511 9 9 8 128
1981 16,908 10.527 4,266 1,442 5 4 3 58
1982 9,061 18,563 5,313 2,257 5 3 5 15
1983 17,461 14.003 3,754 1,321 5 0 4 41
1984 8,499 8,703 27.135 1,318 3 5 4 56
1985 5,917 - 6,363 727 2 5 7 -
a) Based on data from each country. Labor disputes, as a rule, involve protest action.
b) Japanese figures include days of disputes involving protest action and factory 
closure
Source; Abstracted from Keizai Koho Center. Japan 1986 
from Bank of Japan. Comparative International
m U a m s , 1986.
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The Weakening Dollar
The Dollar’s Value in Yen
(I^ te  New York quote at month’s end)
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Source: The Wall Street Journal. July 30,
1986. p.21.
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w é Hong Kong
Jopêtt
Se^t Oct Nov. Dec Jan. Feb. Mar. Ap. May June July 
 1985----- 1----I------------ 1986------------------
Source: U  S. D e p a r t m e n t  of C o m m e r c e .  " H i o n i i g t i t s  of U.S. E x p o r t  a n d  Im p o r t
trade."
{Abstracted from The Japan Economic Journal. October 11, 1986.p5)
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Japanese Companies’ Major Acquisitions of Foreign Companies
(Aquisition value in ¥  b illion  in parentbesesi
Jan. -85 Sanwa Bank (13.75) 'M o rg a n  Stanley and others  
Continental Illino is Leasing ( U S .)
N ippon Steel Corp. < -  )
E lec tro  P lasm a inc. (U  S )
Sumitom o Rubber industries L td . ( 27,00. tw o firms" 
to ta l)
Dunlop L td .'s  tire  p lants (U K )
Dunlop AG 's fire  p lants (W . G erm an y)
C larion Co. ( I  tO)
N ational Subscription Television's sales rights  
(US.)
Feb. '85 Aderans (0 25) 'B a n k  ot Tokyo  
Charles A itie ri inc. (U  S )
Hosokawa M icro n  Corp. (6  SO)
U.S. F ille r  System s inc. (U  S )
M arubeni Corp. (0  45)
B ieim  Steel Co. (U  5 I 
D ig ita l Com puter L td  (0 5)
F orw ard  Technology inc . (U  S )
M a r . "85 Komatsu L td . (0.88)
Some plants of Koehring Co. (U  S )
M inebea Co. (25 83)
New  H am p sh ire  B all Bearings inc. (U  S )
A pr. '85 Nissho Iw a i Corp. ( I  35)
B erw ick Steel Co. (U .S .)
M ay '85 Koike Sanso Kogyo Co. \ .
Nippon Sanso K .K . *
BOC In c .’S cutting  m achine and positioner 
business (U .S .)
Nisshin Steel Co. (5.05)
Thinsheet M e ta ls  Co. (U  S )
T oray  Industries in c . (2.00)
T rea  Industry  Inc. (U .S .)
July 85 M inebea Co. (3.00)
M ia m i Lakes O peration (U .S .)
Kaw asaki Steel C orp. (I.eO)
General E le c tr ic  Co.'s Tacom a p lan t (U .S .)
Aug. "85 Alps E lec tric  Co. (3.35)
Some plants Of Apple Com puter inc. (U .S .)
O ct. "85 Kawastïo Corp. <1.821
Alerco & H a yw ard  Steel inc. (U .S .)
Sunfory L id . ( 10 00) 'L e h m a n  Brothers and others 
K yotaru  Co. (M O )
M u rra y  W estern Foods inc . (U .S .)
Copal CO. 0 .0 0 )
Poko Corp.'s M in iia b o p e ra iio n  (U .S .)
NOV. 85 M itsubishi Corp. (3  50)
Kuk M an u fac tu rin g  Co. (U .S .)
D e c . '85 Nippon Kokan K .K . (3.20)
G eneral E lec tric  Co.’s silicon products  
division (V  S.)
O and K Co. <0.«5>
W iresales Co. ( U S )
Jan. 84 Konishiroku Photo I n d u i t r f  Co. (15 OOl 
Royal Business M achines inc (U  S )
F u iik u ra  L td . <3 SO)
P E P  industries Inc (U  S )
N akano V inegar Co. (0 40)
Lyndonville  V inegar inc. ( U S )
Feb '84 T a k a ra  Shuio Co. (0 SO)
to m .itin  O is liltery Co ( UK)
Shiseido Co. (0 90) "L a ;a rd  Frcres 8. Co 
C a rita  SA (F ra n c e )
Rohm Co. (1 0 0 )
Exel M icroelectronics inc ( U S . )
" Nippon Sanso K K I )
Isolech inc ( U S )
Fui» Vending L td . (D 54)
C 5I Sy'.lems I nr (U  S )
M ar '84 Sanyo E lec tric  Co. (2 00)
Design & M Ig  Corp ( U S . )
Nippon Seiko K. K.  (0 54)
M o iorneiics  Corp (U  S )
Apr "84 T a k a ra  Shuto Co (0 45)
Honolulu Salic Brew ery Co, (U  S )
Fu iitsu  L td . ( 3 3 5 )
One division of Burroughs Corp. (U  S )
Toyo Soda M fg . Co. (0 75)
Eurogenetics N V  (B elg ium )
Com puter Software Organisation ( — )
Foothill Research Inc. (U  S )
Settsu Paperboard M Ig . Co. (2 52) "Sumitomo Bank 
Medasonics ( U S . )
M ay 84 M in o lta  C am era Co. I -  )
Develop D r Eisbein G m bH & Co. (W  G erm an y) 
July 84 Ind u stria l Bank of Japan ( — I 'M o rg a n  Stanley
and others 
Paym ent O aikyo  Kanko Co. (40 0 )
incom p. Sheraton Hotel (A u stra lia )
" Japan A ir Lines Co. (2 00)
In ternational A irline Pilot Supply Co.'s tra in ing
fac ilities  ( U S )
Sanwa Bank ( 42 00)
Lloyds Bank C aliforn ia ( U S )
Oamippon ink A Chemicals Inc. ( I 
10 com panies of H a rtm a n  Group (E igh t European  
nations)
M itsu i a Co. ( )
Standard Thomson Corp. (U .S .)
Notes • (temotes in term ediaries
Some figures are estim ates.
Source: The japan Economic Journal. August 2, 1986. p. 3.
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«lopwi's Direct Dvereeee Investment 
(FY 19 51 -19 85 )
No. of Amount®^
Cases (USS million)















Uwwn s Direct Overseas investment
by Country
No of Amount®)











Korea, Rep. of 1,282 1,683
Saudi Arabia/Kuwait 4 1,268
Mexico 238 1,330
Netherlands 294 1,687
Total 3 6 ,9 2 7 8 3 ,6 4 9
a)Pigures are the accumulated value of approvals aid notification.
Source: Abstracted from Keizai Koho Center. Uecan 1986. 
from Ministry of Finance. Japan.
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Japan’s Electronics Firms 
Expand U.S. Investment






1976 7 7 7 8 7 9 ' 8 0  *81*82 *83 *84*85 
Note: Fiscml Years, ending March 31
Soime' M in ittr if < / F in tm t*
Source; Abstracted from The Wall Street Journal. 
September 16, 1986. p. 19.
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Canon's Network of Overseas Production Bases
Personal copiers, 
electrenic typewri^s
I I Current 















Source: The Japan Economic Journal. May 31, 1986. p. 10
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Total Population of Robots by Application in Selected 







Japan 67300*)) 11842 10737 14946
U.S.A. 14500*)) 3271 1525 3249
Germany. F.R. 6600*)) 2416 248 646
France 2750*)) 811 140 694
U.K. 2623*)) 583 103 629
Italy 2585*)) 700 200 900
Sweden 2400*)) - -
Czechoslovakia 1845 47 38 1283
Canada 1753 392 20 145
Belgium 859*)) 285 4 75
Australia 528 175 - 287^)
a) Includes casting application. b> 1984 c) Includes finishing, 
loading and unloading, and casting applications.
Source: Abstracted from Keizai Koho Center Japan 1986. 
from Robot Institute of America; Japan Industrial 
Robot Association.
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U.S. Response: tndWldual Firm Level
L  Identify and Assess tr» Comretitlve Advantage: Since the J^janese have altered the structure 
and competitive dynanics of almost all industries they have entered, it is critical that U.S. firms 
continually monitw* and analyze such changes. U.S. firms should determine the extent of their 
competitive advantage and develop methods they can use to overcome the disadvantages they 
currently face. By using tlw Advoitage-Time plane, a forecast can be made to analyze current 
and future advmtages of the prodwt in question. ( See Figure f .0 )
thSu£.lDB S-ACtyjMllSQBi Ling:
By using the Advantage-Time Plow, it is esential to understand tmth the internal variables (eg., 
the company's strategic resjxwisc) end the external variables.
For Japanese firms, the external varlrtjles may include;
-  National portfolio management and targeting
-  Industry diaracteristics
- Industrial groups
For U.S. firms, tte external varioles may include:
-  Government policies
-  The b^iavior of œmpetitors
- The behavior of otlw  in&istries
By target!rQ 'other intfcjstries," Japan's national portfolio managwnent ensures that mature 
industries w ill assist to'geted industries to yow rapidly. Ttese mature irafcistries generate 
cash for investments md maintain high employment so that hi^-technolog/ firms cm automate 
their facilities. The high-technology firms contribute to mature industries in areas of process 
technology where robotics and office automation, for example, help the mature industries reduce 
operating costs.
3. Understand Japanese Success Strategies
It is important that the U.S. firms understand how Japanese success came atout. U.S. firms 
must also realize that Jwmese success depended on a cwnbinatiai of the vmious factors 
related to socioeconomic environment, government/business environment, competitive 
environment, md wgmiMional environment. Here, U.S. managwnmt must maly% wxi define 
Japanese competitive capabilities md weaknesses.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 1.0















Source; Kotler, Farhey, Jatusrip ltak  
The New Competition
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4. Realize the breadth of Ooticms Available to U.S. Firms
Response to Uapwwse com(»titfon can be classified along two dimensions. first dimension 
determines if the public ( r  private sectors are undert^ing the response. Tte secmd dimension 
determines if their response is œmpetitive or ca^^ative  in nature. By crossing these 
dimensions, the four broad responses make up the Strategic Response Matrix (5RM). SRM can 
be used to identify opjwrtunities existing in each cell, (See Figure 1.1) U.S. mwagers must 
also investigate ways of operatir^ in different combinations of cells wd movir^ through the cells 
ovwtime.
However, U.S. firms can also try to influence Japan's rtioice of twget inAjstries by 
using market signaling to indicate their intention to maintain leadership in certain industries 
By raising entry bwriers th ro i#  heavy R&D, U.S. firms may fwce Japwese cwnpetition to 
reconsider their choice of that target industry.
5. Enoaoe in Longer-Run Planning
The responsibility of satisfyir^ stockholders' short-term needs has acted as a major constraint 
on the competitive capability of many U.S. firms. Three factors that could whaœ the ability of 
U.S. firms to accept more risk and compete better are:
StockIwlders could change performance measures from E w nir^ per Share (EPS), 
Return on Investment (ROD, accural-based net incane, or stock prices to other more 
appropriate indicators.
Lengthen the time horizon for evaluatir^ management's performance.
Be willing to accept loww short run profits In hot» of gaining hiçper profits in the long 
run.
6. Planning and Executing (^OToetitive Strategies
U.S. industrial management has long been regarded as a standard of excellence but the new 
competition poses rœw challenges which may require that past practices be reexanined. The 
following discussioi w ill sepwate out the strategic options available to smaller versus larger 
firms.
Strategic Ootlois for Small wd Medium-Sized F irms
Flank-PQSition Defense The objective here Is to create a strong marketing mix that 
can withstwd any possible assault by the Japanese.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 1.1
A  Classification of Potential Strategic 








. ProvWw^ direct financial . Improving quality and
aid to industry service
. Enforc#ig « ititru s t laws . Lowering costs
. Imposing h i ^ r  ta riffs . . Increasing aggressive
quotas, bans stance
2 3
. Reducing mutual trade 
barriers  
. Arranging joint foreign 
aid to developmg countries
. Licensing companies in 
other countries 
. Entering joint ventwes 
with other companies 
. Using other nations' 
trading companies and banks 
. Pursuing mergers and 
acquisitions
Source: Kotler. Fmhey. Jetuanoitek TM New ComoeUliDn
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 103
Flonkino Attack: Identify competitor's weaknesses in prodwt markets. Avoid direct 
challenges to their strengths. Improve more on product features, (ÿjality, services, and 
distribu te  than on initiating price cuts. Seek market se^nents. Segments must be:
-  of sufficient size with potential growth.
- of negligible interest to stronger competitors.
- where the firm must have adequate skill and resources to compete in ttw segment.
-  w iw e the firm is be able to defend itself against future challenges.
Guerrilla Strategy. Launch intermittent, short-burst, surprise assults on markets 
where the Japanese challer^ is strong.
Strategic Potions for Large Firms
Bypass Strategy: Diversify into unrelated areas and/or new geographical markets; 
domestic arwJ international. Pursue global competitive strategies — shift production to 
NICs to reduce producticm costs.
Innovation: Seek to establish product leadership with agyesive product innovation 
efforts.
Buying Market Share This is similar to the Japanese strategy of ^)sorbing losses 
th ro i#  low price, high quality products, it must also t» accompanied by strong R&D 
to reduce productif costs.
Head-on Counterattack: This is accomplished throu^ competir^ price for price,
product for product and so forth, Ftere strong financial resources end heavy investments 
in R&D w ill be necesswy.
Conduct joint ventures with other U.S. firms cr with NICs, or tte Japanese themselves.
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